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THE TROUBLE WITH TIME SERVED
Kimberly Kessler Ferzan
Every jurisdiction in the United States gives criminal defendants “credit”
against their sentence for the time they spend detained pretrial. In a world
of mass incarceration and overcriminalization that disproportionately
impacts people of color, this practice appears to be a welcome mechanism
for mercy and justice. In fact, however, crediting detainees for time served
is perverse. It harms the innocent. A defendant who is found not guilty, or
whose case is dismissed, gets nothing. Crediting time served also allows the
state to avoid internalizing the full costs of pretrial detention, thereby making
overinclusive detention standards less expensive. Finally, crediting time
served links prevention with punishment, retroactively justifying punitive,
substandard conditions. The bottom line is this: Time served is not a
panacea. To the contrary, it contributes to criminal justice pathologies.
This Article systematically details the rationales for pretrial detention
and then analyzes when, given those rationales, credit for time served is
warranted. The analysis reveals that crediting time served is a destructive
practice on egalitarian, economic, expressive, and retributive grounds. Time
served should be abandoned. Detainees should be financially compensated
instead. Given that many detentions are premised upon a theory similar to a
Fifth Amendment taking, compensation is warranted for all defendants—both
the innocent and the guilty—and can lead to positive reforms. Only by
abandoning credit for time served can the link between prevention and
punishment be severed, such that detention will be more limited and more
humane.

Word Count= 29,994 (with abstract)
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THE TROUBLE WITH TIME SERVED
Kimberly Kessler Ferzan*

Imagine you are a juror in a high-profile case. The court decides that
you need to be sequestered, and rather than putting you up at the local Holiday
Inn, the state provides its own “hotel.” You have a roommate, a toilet in the
room, and bars instead of walls. Instead of a concierge, a guard subjects you
to a cavity search. You are in jail.
This would clearly be unacceptable to you. You haven’t done
anything wrong to warrant this sort of treatment by the state. Indeed, it would
seem hard for you to believe that the state’s interest in this particular criminal
case would override your rights so as to justify placing you in a cell.
Yet, we routinely treat people like this. Material witnesses—
witnesses—are housed in our jails.1 But jails are primarily intended for
pretrial detainees. Throughout the United States, almost a half a million
defendants are detained pretrial on any given day.2 And, these detainees are
disproportionately people of color.3
*Earle Hepburn Professor of Law and Professor of Philosophy, University of
Pennsylvania Carey Law School. For comments on this paper, I thank Dave Hoffman, Rich
Hynes, Leo Katz, Emma Kaufman, Adam Kolber, Sandy Mayson, Stephen Morse, Liam
Murphy, and Sam Scheffler. This paper benefitted from presentation at the NYU
Colloquium in Legal and Political Philosophy, the UVA/UNC/Maryland Virtual Crim
Workshop, the Edinburgh/Glasgow Virtual Crim Discussion Group, the Penn Law Faculty
Workshop, the NYU Furman Seminar, and the Queen’s Colloquium in Legal and Political
Philosophy. I am deeply indebted to my research assistants Jennifer Davis, Gordon Estes,
Sarah Goodman, Emily Horwitz, Andrew Lief, Thomas Myers, Hannah Stommel, and
Emerson Womble, as well as research librarian Genevieve Tung for extraordinary research
assistance.
1
Bell v. Wolfish, 441 U.S. 520, 524-26 (1979) (evaluating conditions of confinement
and noting that not just pretrial detainees but also material witnesses are housed in the
correctional center). See generally Ronald L. Carlson and Mark S. Voelpel, Material Witness
and Material Injustice, 58 WASH. U. L. Q. 1, 3 (1980) (noting the extensive use of material
witness statutes such that some unaccused and clearly innocent individuals are detained
simply because they are unable to pay bail).
2
On a one-day snapshot, 480,700 inmates in local jails were held while awaiting court
action in 2019. ZHEN ZENG & TODD D. MINTON, U.S. DEP’T OF JUST., BUREAU OF JUST.
STAT., NCJ255608, JAIL INMATES IN 2019, at 1, 5 tbl.3 (2021),
https://bjs.ojp.gov/content/pub/pdf/ji19.pdf. Covid did decrease these counts in 2020. TODD
D. MINTON, ZHEN ZENG & LAURA M. MARUSCHAK, U.S. DEP’T OF JUST., BUREAU OF JUST.
STAT., NCJ 255888, IMPACT OF COVID-19 ON THE LOCAL JAIL POPULATION, at 13 tbl.10
(2021), https://bjs.ojp.gov/content/pub/pdf/icljpjj20.pdf.
3
ZENG & MINTON, supra note 2, at 1 (finding Black defendants are detained pretrial at
three times the rate of white defendants); Brook Hopkins, Chiraag Bains & Colin Doyle,
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The Supreme Court says that this treatment of pretrial detainees is not
punishment.4 How could it be? Pretrial detainees have not had a trial to
determine their guilt. They are presumed innocent at this point. The entire
process for putting them behind bars took only a minute or two,5 and in some
states, they would not have a right to an attorney before being jailed.6 Some
will have their cases dismissed or will be found not guilty. But what would
justify such treatment if it is not punishment?
Maybe the Supreme Court is wrong to say that pretrial detention is
not punishment. At one point, it did seem to recognize that the promiscuous
use of pretrial detention would effectively pre-punish.7 Other courts have
Principles of Pretrial Release: Reforming Bail without Repeating Its Harms, 108 J. CRIM. L.
& CRIMINOLOGY 679, 681 (2018) (citing empirical research indicating that Hispanic and
Black defendants are more often subjected to pretrial detention than similarly situated white
defendants); Julian Adler, Sarah Picard & Caitlin Flood, Arguing the Algorithm: Pretrial
Risk Assessment and the Zealous Defender, 21 CARDOZO J. CONFLICT RESOL. 581, 582
(2020) (noting that while algorithms may be intended to correct for subjective racial biases,
they may nonetheless be “unfairly punitive to black defendants, placing them in higher risk
categories at twice the rate of white defendants”); Ellen A. Donnelly & John M. MacDonald,
The Downstream Effects of Bail and Pretrial Detention on Racial Disparities in
Incarceration, 108 J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 775, 780–81 (2018) (“[B]ail and pretrial
detention absorb much of the criminal processing disparities between Blacks and Whites.
Pretrial conditions contribute to 3.5% of explainable Black-White disparity in convictions
and 37.2% of the disparity in guilty pleas. These processes explain nearly 30% of the BlackWhite disparity in the decision to sentence a defendant to any period of incarceration and
under a quarter of the disparity in average incarceration sentence length.”)
4
United States v. Salerno, 481 U.S. 739, 741, 748 (1987) (“We conclude, therefore, that
the pretrial detention contemplated by the Bail Reform Act is regulatory in nature, and does
not constitute punishment before trial in violation of the Due Process Clause.”). As the Court
states in Bell v. Wolfish:
Whether it be called a jail, a prison, or a custodial center, the purpose of the facility
is to detain. Loss of freedom of choice and privacy are inherent incidents of
confinement in such a facility. And the fact that such detention interferes with the
detainee's understandable desire to live as comfortably as possible and with as little
restraint as possible during confinement does not convert the conditions or
restrictions of detention into “punishment.”
441 U.S. at 537.
5
See Bent on Bail, INJUSTICE WATCH: UNEQUAL TREATMENT (Oct. 14, 2016),
https://www.injusticewatch.org/interactives/bent-on-bail (finding hearings in Chicago took
one to two minutes).
6
Douglas L. Colbert, Prosecution without Representation, 59 BUFF. L. REV. 333, 39596 (2011) (using surveys to determine that ten states do not provide indigent defendants with
counsel at their initial bail hearing). These defendants usually wait “a month or longer”
before another hearing where they have an attorney. Id. at 387.
7
“This traditional right to freedom before conviction permits the unhampered
preparation of a defense, and serves to prevent the infliction of punishment prior to
conviction. . . . Unless this right to bail before trial is preserved, the presumption of
innocence, secured only after centuries of struggle, would lose its meaning.” Stack v. Boyle,
342 U.S. 1, 4 (1951) (emphasis added) (citation omitted).
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acknowledged the same fact.8 Scholars, journalists, and even the average
person on the street consistently conflate the distinction between jail and
prison.9 And then there are the conditions of our jails: if it looks like a duck,
and quacks like a duck, then maybe it’s really punishment.10
But there is one simple fact that puts the lie to our lips when we claim
that pretrial detention isn’t punishment and it is this: Every state and the
federal government provide for credit for time served.11 All that time spent
in pretrial detention counts toward the punishment. We don’t even blink at

8
E.g., Smith v. State, 508 S.W.2d 54, 57 (Ark. 1974) (“Whatever it may be called, it is
certainly a deprivation of liberty, which, in itself, is punishment to most human beings. We
should not like to try to convince those held in such confinement, along with those
undergoing punishment, of the soundness of such an argument. We reject it, as other courts
have.”) (citations omitted).
9
See Is It “Jail” or “Prison”?: How They Differ and Overlap, MERRIAM-WEBSTER,
https://www.merriam-webster.com/words-at-play/jail-vs-prison-difference (last visited Jan.
11, 2022 (providing instances of conflation).
10
On jail conditions, see infra Part I.A.3.
11
18 U.S.C. § 3585; ALA. CODE § 15-18-5 (2018); ALASKA STAT. § 12.55.025 (2020);
ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. § 13-712 (2021); ARK. CODE ANN. § 5-4-404 (2021); CAL. PENAL
CODE § 2900.5 (2021); COLO. REV. STAT § 18-1.3-405 (2021); CONN. GEN. STAT. § 18-98d
(2021); Crawford v. Comm'r of Corr., 982 A.2d 620, 642 (Conn. 2009) (“[I]n order for a
petitioner to receive jail credit, he [or she] must request the credit and must do so at the time
of sentencing.”); DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 11, § 3901 (West 2021); FLA. STAT. § 921.161 (2021);
GA. CODE ANN. § 17-10-11 (2021); HAW. REV. STAT. § 706-671 (2020); IDAHO CODE § 18309 (2021); 730 ILL. COMP. STAT. 5/5-4.5-100 (2021); IND. CODE § 35-50-6-3 (2021) (credit
time classification for offenses prior to July 1, 2014); id. § 35-50-6-3.1 (2021) (credit time
classification for offenses after June 30, 2014); id. § 35-50-6-4 (2021) (initial assignment to
credit time classification); IOWA CODE § 903A.5 (2022); KAN. STAT. ANN. § 21-6615 (West
2021); KY. REV. STAT. ANN. § 532.120 (2021); LA. CODE. CRIM. PROC. art. 880 (2021); ME.
STAT. tit 17-A, § 2305 (2021); MD. CODE ANN., CRIM. PROC. § 6-218 (West 2021); MASS.
GEN. LAWS ch. 279, § 33A (2021); MICH. COMP. LAWS § 769.11b (2021); MINN. CT. R.
CRIM. P. 27.03; MISS. CODE ANN. § 99-19-23 (2021); MO. REV. STAT. § 558.031 (2021);
MONT. CODE ANN. § 46-18-403 (2021) (crediting time served only for bailable offenses, to
prevent inequities with indigent defendants); NEB. REV. STAT. § 47-503 (2021); NEV. REV.
STAT. § 176.055 (2019–2020); N.H. REV. STAT. ANN. § 651-A:23 (2021); N.J. CT. R. 3:218; N.M. STAT. ANN. § 31-20-12 (2021); N.Y. PENAL LAW §70.30(3) (West 2021); N.C. GEN.
STAT. § 15-196.1 (2020); N.D. CENT. CODE § 12.1-32-02 (2021); OHIO REV. CODE ANN.
§ 2967.191 (2021); OKLA. STAT. tit. 57, § 138 (2021); OR. REV. STAT. § 137.320 (2019); 42
PA. CONS. STAT. § 9760 (2021); R.I. GEN. LAWS § 12-19-2 (2021); S.C. CODE ANN. § 2413-40 (2021); S.D. CODIFIED LAWS § 23A-27-18.1 (2021); TENN. CODE ANN. § 40-23-101
(2021); TEX. CODE CRIM. PROC. ANN. art. 42.03(2) (West 2021); UTAH CODE ANN. § 76-3403 (West 2021) (allowing up to ten days credit for every thirty days of incarceration upon
good behavior); VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 13, § 7031(b) (2021); VA. CODE ANN. § 53.1-187 (2021);
WASH. REV. CODE § 9.94A.505(6) (2021); W. VA. CODE § 61-11-24 (2021); WIS. STAT. §
973.155 (2019–20); Petersen v. State, 455 P.3d 261, 265 (Wyo. 2019) (giving trial courts
discretion to award credit for time served).
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the commensurability. At least Scotland is willing to call it what it is—they
call their practice “backdating the sentence.”12
There is much to learn from examining our practice of giving credit
for time served. Only two articles have given it any serious attention—both
blessing the practice because as the authors see it, pretrial detention is
punishment, or at the very least, the hard treatment inherent in punishment.13
Given that we subject individuals to conditions that are punishment-like as
they await trial, it seems only fair that this time counts towards the
punishment they receive. In a world of overcriminalization and mass
incarceration, one cannot help but breathe a sigh of relief at what appears to
be a rare moment of mercy and justice.
But appearances are deceiving. Here’s the problem. The time-served
Band-Aid barely covers the gaping wound, and more concerningly, it may in
fact contribute to the problem. Egalitarians, who seek to use time served to
mitigate the injustice of releasing rich defendants on bail while poor
defendants are detained, should be deeply troubled that defendants who are
both poor and innocent have no recourse under the time-served model.
Expressivists, who take punishment to serve a particular condemnatory
function, should bemoan the conflation of pretrial prevention and
postconviction punishment. Legal economists should question the incentive
effects that time served creates. Capacious detention standards are cheap. In
every case of conviction, the state does not pay both to detain the defendant
pretrial and to punish him post-conviction.14 Hence, it is easier to afford to
detain more people pretrial, thereby significantly impacting the lives of those
who are detained and their families.15 Retributivists and other deontologists
should condemn various implications of the time-served model, including
that current practices unjustly detain innocent people,16 negatively impact

12
Prison
Sentences,
SCOTTISH
SENT’G
COUNCIL,
https://www.scottishsentencingcouncil.org.uk/about-sentencing/prison-sentences
(last
visited Jan. 11, 2022). The sentencing judge identifies the date that the sentence starts, and
can have the sentence start at a date prior to conviction to take into account time spent in
pretrial detention. Criminal Procedure (Scotland) Act of 1995, c. 46, § 210.
13
See generally Adam J. Kolber, Against Proportional Punishment, 66 VAND. L. REV.
1141 (2013); Raff Donelson, Natural Punishment, 100 N.C. L. REV. (forthcoming 2022).
14
To do the math on this, we would need to cash out the time value of money with the
fact that jails offer fewer programs and benefits than prisons. See also text accompanying
notes 146-47 (discussing Wisconsin’s analysis of cost saving when it adopted its credit for
time served statute). It is true that many jurisdictions make defendants pay for the costs of
their incarceration; however, these “pay-to-stay” fees are rarely recouped because defendants
cannot afford to pay. See infra text accompanying notes 160-61.
15
See infra text accompanying notes 112-13.
16
See infra Part II.A.

Electronic copy available at: https://ssrn.com/abstract=4041973

6

The Trouble with Time Served

trial outcomes,17 induce pleas that turn the innocent into the guilty,18 and
potentially under punish those who actually have no complaint against their
legitimate detentions.19 No matter how you look at it, credit for time served
is perverse.
Because time served conceptually and legally links pretrial detention
to punishment, it has to go. Time served makes us complacent about the harm
we do by detention. It makes detention cost less, if not costless. And if we
want not just bail reform, but jail reform, we need to stop thinking of our jails
as places where we punish. We need to rip off the time-served Band-Aid.
To do this, we need to work through two things. First, we need to
truly understand why we are detaining people and how time served relates to
those rationales. Second, we need to figure out what we ought to do in time
served’s stead.
The first task takes up most of this Article. The justifications for our
detention practices are complex, as is the relation of time served to those
justifications. Because much of the current literature on pretrial detention
takes a consequentialist tact, it has flattened the scholarly discussions into
cost-benefit analysis.20 But the normative landscape is far more nuanced than
that, and only a rights-based analysis can truly do justice to precisely what is
at stake when we restrict someone’s liberty by choosing to place him in a cell.
Moreover, understanding how and why time served is responsive to our rights
in different ways in different kinds of cases is the first step in diagnosing how
it goes awry. This Article is the first to systematically analyze how different
rationales for pretrial detention relate to our rights—when such detention is
justified because detainees have forfeited rights, when their rights are
17

Paul Heaton, Sandra Mayson, & Megan Stevenson, The Downstream Consequences
of Misdemeanor Pretrial Detention, 69 STAN. L. REV. 711, 715 (2017) (finding in empirical
study of misdemeanor cases that “pretrial detention causally increases the likelihood of
conviction, the likelihood of receiving a carceral sentence, the length of a carceral sentence,
and the likelihood of future arrest for new crimes”).
18
Id. at 716 (“Misdemeanor pretrial detention therefore seems especially likely to induce
guilty pleas, including wrongful ones.”).
19
See infra Part III.C.
20
See, e.g., Crystal S. Yang, Toward an Optimal Bail System, 92 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1399,
1405 (2017) (“Notably, these objective of the bail system would naturally arise from a
standard, utilitarian social welfare function. . . . Thus, a cost-benefit approach is particularly
appropriate in the pre-trial context . . . .”); John F. Duffy & Richard M. Hynes, Asymmetric
Subsidies and the Bail Crisis, 88 U. CHI. L. REV. 1285, 1298 (2021) (offering a cost-benefit
account of why there should be an “equalization of subsidies” between bail and jail); Megan
T. Stevenson & Sandra G. Mayson, Pretrial Detention and the Value of Liberty (Univ. of
Va. Sch. of L., Pub. L. & Legal Theory Paper No. 2021-14, 2021) (arguing current law adopts
a consequentialist framework and seeking an empirical weighting of the various interests);
Shima Baradaran Baughman, Costs of Pretrial Detention, 97 B.U. L REV. 1 (2017)
(advocating for a cost-based decision-making model).
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overridden, and when they are simply wronged by their detentions.
These distinct rights relations then have different implications. For
instance, if we detain someone who is amorphously “high risk” because we
decide it is more important to prevent him from committing any possible
harm than to let him go, what we are doing is harming him for our benefit.
The detention is a government taking: We are taking him, literally, to hold
behind bars until trial.21 In contrast, if we detain someone because he has a
current plan to harm others, our action is closer to self-defense, and the
defendant has no right against such force.22 If we detain someone because
we think he committed the crime charged, the detention is actually prepunishment.23 But our promiscuous use of “dangerousness” rhetoric about
pretrial detention currently masks a self-defense theory, a takings theory, and
a punishment theory.24 Flight and obstruction add further complexity.
Ultimately, there is a varied terrain of detention rationales.
After setting forth how detention relates to rights, the Article asks how
time served should respond to these various detention rationales. We often
owe compensation to detainees, either because their detention is wrongful or
because it is a justified taking. Time served is a rough approximation of
compensation, but is woefully underinclusive. There are also rare cases in
which crediting time served is unjustified because the detainee is fully liable
to the detention based on his goal of seriously harming another. Different
reasons potentially undergird our current practices.
What becomes apparent is that this complexity masks incoherence.
Far from being systematically responsive to detention rationales, time served
offers an ad hoc, over- and under-inclusive response that contributes to
criminal justice pathologies. Time served harms the innocent and induces the
innocent to plead guilty.25 It allows us to retroactively justify the evils that
we do by counting them as punishment, all while the Supreme Court tells us
that various rights do not attach at the pretrial stage because it is not
punishment.26
21

See infra Part II.B.2.
JEFF MCMAHAN, KILLING IN WAR 10 (2009) (“To attack someone who is liable to be
attacked is neither to violate nor to infringe that person’s right, for the person’s being liable
to attack just is his having forfeited his right not to be attacked, in the circumstances.”).
23
See infra Part II.B.1.b.
24
See infra Part II.B.1.a.
25
See infra Part IV.A.3.
26
See United States v. Salerno, 481 U.S. 739, 760 (1987) (Marshall, J. dissenting):
The majority proceeds as though the only substantive right protected by the Due
Process Clause is a right to be free from punishment before conviction. The majority's
technique for infringing this right is simple: merely redefine any measure which is
claimed to be punishment as “regulation,” and, magically, the Constitution no longer
prohibits its imposition.
22
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The Article closes with a preliminary sketch of a new model. We
should abolish credit for time served and should compensate detainees
instead. A compensation model is superior to credit for time served in several
respects. First, it treats the innocent equally to the guilty. Our current timeserved practices benefit guilty people and leave innocent people—usually
poor, innocent people—with nothing. Second, compensation may limit our
willingness to detain ex ante. Eliminating credit for time served will make
the state internalize more of the fiscal cost of pretrial detention;27 a
requirement of compensation will make the state internalize some of the
personal costs to defendants as well. Perhaps making the state bear the
substantial costs of detention will mean that society can no longer afford its
incapacitation addiction.28 Third, compensation puts money in the pockets
of detainees in ways that might provide the very bail needed for release or
alter their negotiating power with prosecutors.29 Finally, and perhaps most
importantly, it will sever the intuitive, conceptual linkage between detention
and punishment.
If you worry that this proposal will leave some guilty people worse
off because they will suffer pretrial and not get credit at sentencing, that is
because you assume that their pretrial conditions will be punitive. But it is
time served that inexorably links them. Sever the two practices, and we create
the space to ask, how ought we to treat our presumed-innocent detainees?
How ought we to treat our material witnesses? Don’t we owe them not just
compensation but the same conditions that we owe you, our juror? So,
although a compensation scheme is the first step in reform, the goal is also to
create the dialogue not just about when we detain but also about how we
detain. Eliminating credit for time served helps us move forward with this
agenda.
The Article proceeds in four parts. Part I articulates the legal
standards, confinement conditions, and scholarly criticism of pretrial
detention, and also sets forth the law and purported rationales for crediting
time served. Part II looks beyond the legal standards, asking why it is that
we are entitled to detain individuals who might flee, obstruct, or be
dangerous, and also suggests ways in which our current standards may be
overinclusive or otherwise unjustifiable. Part III then asks whether these
various justifications support or undermine credit for time served and
examines the specific arguments necessary to connect the dots from detention
to later credit. Part IV demonstrates that theorists of all perspectives should
be deeply troubled by our current practice of giving time-served credit; far
from having curative properties, it ultimately contributes to the disease of our
27

See infra text accompanying note 146-47.
See infra Part IV.B.3.
29
See id.
28
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current system. The Part then sketches an alternative compensation model
and raises potential objections to such an approach. Whether you endorse my
reform proposal or offer a different one in its place, the current criminal
justice reform agenda must consider the role that time served plays in creating
and reinforcing injustice.

I. PRETRIAL DETENTION AND TIME SERVED: THE LEGAL FRAMEWORK
If a defendant is denied bail or if he cannot afford to pay bail, he will
be detained pretrial.30 Upon later conviction, this time spent in jail is credited
against the period of incarceration to which the defendant would otherwise
be sentenced.31 To understand credit for time served, one must first
understand who is detained and can receive the credit. This Part provides an
overview of current pretrial detention law and practice. Then, it briefly
surveys current frameworks for determining pretrial detention or release and
discusses the conditions of confinement as well as criticisms of our detention
practices, including procedural objections to how determinations are made,
substantive objections to the grounds for detention, and distributional
objections to the disparate impacts on the poor and people of color. Finally,
with an understanding of who is detained pretrial and why in hand, this Part
turns to the law governing credit for time served. After noting such credit is
available in every jurisdiction, the rationales and timing of statutory
adoptions are discussed.

A. Pretrial Detention and Bail
1. Supreme Court Jurisprudence
Two lessons can be extracted from Supreme Court jurisprudence in
this area. First, the Court has blessed the evolution of pretrial practices from
the goal of securing appearance at trial to that of detaining the dangerous.
Second, despite almost adopting a view that pretrial confinement was a form
of punishment, the Court now clearly and consistently takes the view that the
two were completely distinct.
In 1835, the stated purpose of bail was appearance at trial. In Ex Parte
Milburn, the defendant failed to appear and forfeited his bail money.32 He
claimed that he could not then be tried for the offense, a jailable
30

See infra I.A.2.
See supra note 11.
32
34 U.S. (9 Pet.) 704 (1835).
31
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misdemeanor, because the bail forfeiture was already the punishment. 33 The
Court rejected his argument:
A recognizance of bail, in a criminal case, is taken to secure the due
attendance of the party accused, to answer the indictment, and to
submit to a trial, and the judgment of the court thereon. It is not
designed as a satisfaction for the offence, when it is forfeited and paid,
but as a means of compelling the party to submit to the trial and
punishment, which the law ordains for his offence.34
Then, Stack v. Boyle, dismissing the habeas petition of Communists
who contended that they were held by excessive bail without an
individualized showing of flight risk, reaffirmed that the primary goal was
appearance at trial.35 As Justice Jackson noted in his concurrence, “The
question when application for bail is made relates to each one’s
trustworthiness to appear for trial and what security will supply reasonable
assurance of his appearance.”36
Interestingly, both the Stack majority and the concurrence share the
worry that unnecessary detention is punishment. The majority opines that
bail “serves to prevent the infliction of punishment prior to conviction.” So,
too, the concurrence echoes, “Without this conditional privilege [of granting
bail], even those wrongly accused are punished by the period of
imprisonment.”37
Though dangerousness lurked in the background of early bail
practices,38 the Court embraced this rationale in Carlson v. Landon.39 There,
noncitizens were detained before potentially being deported for their
membership in the Communist party.40 Notably, the district judge, after
indicating that he was not worried about failure to appear, stated, “I am not
33

Id. at 708.
Id. at 710. This is not the original conception of bail. The Anglo-Saxon English roots
of our practice required the posting of the exact amount of the fine (the “bot”) for the private
grievance. June Carbone, Seeing Through the Emperor's New Clothes: Rediscovery of Basic
Principles in the Administration of Bail, 34 SYRACUSE L. REV. 517, 519-21 (1983). Hence
a forfeiture of the bail was the punishment for the crime. Id. at 520 (“Since the amount of
the pledge and the possible penalty were identical, the effect of a successful escape would
have been a default judgment for the amount of the bot.”).
35
342 U.S. 1, 6-7 (1951) (dismissing habeas petition because defendants should have
appealed their motion to reduce bail).
36
Id. at 9 (Jackson, J. concurring).
37
Id. at 8 (Jackson, J., concurring) (emphasis added).
38
Carbone, supra note 34, at 522 (noting that the offense of homicide became
nonbailable in the twelfth century).
39
342 U.S. 524 (1952).
40
Id. at 528-29.
34
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going to turn these people loose if they are Communists, any more than I
would turn loose a deadly germ in this community.”41 The Court agreed:
The refusal of bail in these cases is not arbitrary or capricious or an
abuse of power. There is no denial of the due process of the Fifth
Amendment under circumstances where there is reasonable
apprehension of hurt from aliens charged with a philosophy of
violence against this government.42
Soon after this initial endorsement of dangerousness, the Court had
occasion to reconsider whether pretrial confinement constituted punishment.
In Bell v. Wolfish, the Court found that a pretrial detention center’s invasive
policies, including cavity searches, were constitutional.43 Central to the
Court’s analysis was that pretrial detention is not punishment and the
conditions should not be evaluated as such.44
Juvenile detentions and the enactment of the expansive pretrial
detention regime within the federal Bail Reform Act of 1984 were similarly
justified as preventive and similarly construed as nonpunitive.45 In Schall v.
Martin, the Court upheld the constitutionality of juvenile detention before
trial when there was a serious risk the juvenile would commit an offense.46
Whereas the Court of Appeals had found that the juveniles were detained “not
for preventive purposes, but to impose punishment for unadjudicated acts,”47
the Court claimed that “[t]he ‘legitimate and compelling state interest’ in
protecting the community from crime cannot be doubted.”48 This detention,
concluded the Court, was not punishment.49
And, in United States v. Salerno, the Court rejected a facial attack on
the Bail Reform Act.50 Again, the focus was dangerousness. Noting that the
statute only applies to “extremely serious offenses,”51 requires clear and
convincing evidence,52 and contains numerous procedural safeguards
including the right to counsel, to present witnesses, to testify, and to cross-

41

Id. at 550 (Black, J., dissenting).
Id. at 542 (majority opinion).
43
441 U.S. 520, 523-24 (1979).
44
Id. at 535.
45
18 U.S.C. § 3141 et seq. (Bail Reform Act).
46
467 U.S. 253 (1984).
47
Id. at 262 (quoting Martin v. Strasburg, 689 F.2d 365, 372 (2d Cir. 1982)).
48
Id. at 264.
49
Id. at 271.
50
481 U.S. 739, 741 (1987).
51
Id. at 750.
52
Id. at 742.
42
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examine,53 the Court found that detention when “no release conditions ‘will
reasonably assure . . . the safety of any other person and the community’”
was constitutionally defensible.54 Moreover, the Court, while noting that
detainees are not kept in prison,55 concluded that pretrial detention is
regulatory, not penal.56 The Court reasoned that the government has a
regulatory interest in community safety, that the government’s interest in
preventing crime by arrestees is both legitimate and compelling, and
therefore that the individual’s liberty interest could be subordinated to the
“greater needs of society.”57

2. Current Legal Frameworks
Against this constitutional backdrop, defendants are detained pretrial
via one of two routes. First, the accused can be denied bail. This denial can
be because the offense itself is not bailable, or because the accused is deemed
a high flight risk or sufficiently dangerous such that bail is not granted.
Although many states have a constitutional right to bail, this requirement is
far from universal.58 Moreover, these constitutional rights are often qualified
to exclude certain crimes or to allow for consideration of dangerousness.59
Second, if the court sets bail too high, a defendant may be unable to pay, the
result of which is the defendant is held pretrial.
The first type of case has rigorous rules.60 As an exemplar, consider
the federal system. Under the Bail Reform Act of 1984, detention is
authorized based on a serious risk of flight,61 a serious risk of obstruction,62
or dangerousness.63 In determining whether detention is authorized for these
reasons, a court considers the nature of the crime charged, the weight of the
evidence, the defendant’s character and community ties, the defendant’s legal
status (such as on probation) at the time of the arrest, and “the nature and
seriousness of the danger to any person or the community that would be posed
53

Id.
Id. at 741.
55
Id. at 748. But see infra Part I.A.3 (noting how jails are worse than prisons).
56
Salerno, 481 U.S. at 747.
57
Id. at 748-51.
58
AMBER WIDGERY, NAT’L CONF. OF STATE LEGISLATURES, THE STATUTORY
FRAMEWORK
OF
PRETRIAL
RELEASE
2-3
(2020),
https://www.ncsl.org/Portals/1/Documents/cj/Framework-of-Pretrial-Release_v07_web.pdf
59
Id. at 3.
60
See Sandra G. Mayson, Detention by Any Other Name, 69 DUKE L.J. 1643, 1651
(2020) (noting “robust procedural requirements” in both the federal and state systems).
61
18 U.S.C. § 3142(f)(2)(A).
62
Id. § 3142(f)(2)(B).
63
Id. § 3142(f)(1).
54
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by the person’s release.”64 Many state statutes look to the same factors as the
federal model, including Delaware,65 the District of Columbia, 66 Illinois,67
Nevada,68 New Jersey,69 New York,70 and Pennsylvania.71 California departs
from the federal model as it does not enumerate the defendant’s character as
a factor,72 and Kentucky and Wisconsin streamline their analysis somewhat.73
This is a marked contrast to the sort of state procedures that
accompany the setting of bail, which (to put it mildly) can be quite brief and
unstructured. As Sandy Mayson describes:
Magistrates announce bail amounts utterly beyond the capacity of the
accused to meet in two-minute, uncounseled hearings, squinting at the
accused on a videolink or in a crowded courtroom, one after the other,
day in and day out. There are few limits and little process in these
proceedings.74
Scholars have argued that in practice “trial court judges have virtually
unlimited legal discretion in determining the amount of bail.”75 Christine S.
Scott-Hayward and Henry F. Fradella’s review of various studies found that
“the two most important factors, those that best predict the bail decision, are
(1) the seriousness of the charged offense and (2) the defendant’s criminal
history.”76 Moreover, courts can illicitly detain for dangerousness sub rosa
simply by setting bail too high for the defendant to meet.77 And, even when
64

Id. § 3142(g).
DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 11, § 2105 (West 2021).
66
D.C. CODE § 23-1322 (2021).
67
725 ILL. COMP. STAT. 5/110-5 (2021).
68
NEV. REV. STAT. § 178.4853 (2021).
69
N.J. STAT. ANN. § 2A:162-20 (West 2021).
70
N.Y. CRIM. PROC. LAW § 510.30 (McKinney 2021).
71
PA. R. CRIM. P. 523 (2021).
72
CAL. PENAL CODE § 1275 (West 2021).
73
KY. REV. STAT. ANN. § 431.066 (West 2021); WIS. STAT. § 969.035 (2019–20). But
see Judicial Guidelines for Pretrial Release and Monitored Conditional Release, Order 201720 (Ky. 2017), https://kycourts.gov/Courts/Supreme-Court/Supreme%20Court%20Orders/
201720.PDF (specifying information that pretrial services should look to and largely
mirroring the federal factors).
74
Mayson, supra note 60, at 1645.
75
CHRISTINE S. SCOTT-HAYWARD & HENRY F. FRADELLA, PUNISHING POVERTY: HOW
BAIL AND PRETRIAL DETENTION FUEL INEQUALITIES IN THE CRIMINAL JUSTICE SYSTEM 9
(2019).
76
Id. at 40. The impact can be covert; for instance, crime severity might be taken into
account in the prosecutor’s bail request. MARY T. PHILLIPS, N.Y.C. CRIM. JUST. AGENCY,
INC., A DECADE OF BAIL RESEARCH IN NEW YORK CITY 68 (2012),
https://www.prisonpolicy.org/scans/DecadeBailResearch12.pdf (noting significant role of
prosecutors’ recommendations and the significant role of crime severity in their requests).
77
See Mayson, supra note 60, at 1659 (“The term “sub rosa detention” typically refers
65

Electronic copy available at: https://ssrn.com/abstract=4041973

14

The Trouble with Time Served

bail is not being set to covertly detain for dangerousness, inattentiveness to
the defendant’s ability to pay in setting the bail figure can itself result in
pretrial detention.78
3. The Conditions of Pretrial Detention
When individuals are detained pretrial, they go to jail. Jails
predominantly house pretrial detainees.79 The average time spent in jail in
2019 was twenty-six days.80 Although jails are often thought to be
interchangeable with prisons, it is important to examine precisely how jails
can and do function.
Because jails are for short-timers, they lack some of the programs that
prisons have. Inmates lack access to educational, vocational, and life skills
training.81 They get less physical exercise.82 And their housing includes less
outside light.83 Jails can be overcrowded. In 2019, Kentucky, West Virginia,
and Virginia jails were all operating above capacity.84
Conditions can be bleak. Indeed, some detainees may plead guilty
just to get from jail to prison where the facilities are better.85 Consider the
Cuyoga County Corrections Center in Cleveland, Ohio, where, in 2010, a
pretrial detainee would expect to spend fifty days.86 A 2018 DOJ review
to the practice of setting unaffordable bail with the specific intention of detaining a defendant
whom the court lacks authority to detain outright, or without having to comply with full
detention process.”).
78
SCOTT-HAYWARD & FRADELLA, supra note 75, at 42 (noting study showing defense
counsel do not raise the issue and when raised, judges are not receptive).
79
ZHEN ZENG & TODD MINTON, U.S. DEP’T OF JUST., BUREAU OF JUST. STAT., NCJ
255406, CENSUS OF JAILS, 2005–2019 -STATISTICAL TABLES, at 2 (2021) [hereinafter ZENG
&
MINTON,
CENSUS
OF
JAILS],
https://bjs.ojp.gov/sites/g/files/xyckuh236/files/media/document/cj0519st.pdf (noting that in
the majority of states, two-thirds of jail detainees are being held pretrial and in five states,
the figure exceeds eighty percent).
80
ZENG & MINTON, supra note 2.
81
Christopher Wildeman, Maria D. Fitzpatrick & Alyssa W. Goldman, Conditions of
Confinement in American Prisons and Jails, 14 ANN. REV. L. & SOC. SCI. 29, 35 tbl.2 (2018).
82
Id.
83
Id.
84
ZENG & MINTON, CENSUS OF JAILS, supra note 79, at 3.
85
Emily Leslie & Nolan G. Pope, The Unintended Impact of Pretrial Detention on Case
Outcomes: Evidence from New York City Arraignments, 60 J. L. & ECON. 529, 552 (2017)
(noting this inducement for pleading guilty); Abbie VanSickle & Manuel Villa, Who Begs to
Go to Prison? California Jail Inmates, MARSHALL PROJECT (Apr. 23, 2019, 7:20 PM),
https://www.themarshallproject.org/2019/04/23/who-begs-to-go-to-prison-california-jailinmates (comparing conditions).
86
Cuyahoga County Sheriff, FAQ’s: Cuyahoga County Correction Center – “The Jail”,
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found that cells meant to house two people housed twelve with mattresses
placed on the floor.87 Despite the cells’ extremely cold temperatures, inmates
were denied a second blanket.88 Cells lacked toilet paper and toothbrushes.89
Shower facilities lacked curtains, leaving inmates fully exposed to the
guards.90 Food was below nutritional requirements, was not properly
refrigerated, and was sometimes denied as a punitive measure.91 There was
no infirmary.92 Within one year, fifty-five people attempted suicide and three
succeeded.93 And there were fifty-two Prison Rape Elimination Act
incidents.94 Inmate interviews revealed “strong and consistent allegation[s]
of brutality, [use of force] punishment, and cruel treatments at the hands of
the Security Response Team.”95
This is not an outlier case. Reports and lawsuits present numerous
stories. Oklahoma County jail detainees faced bedbugs and were allowed to
shower less than once a week.96 In Sacramento, prisoners who were held on
suicide watch were put in a room that had a grate instead of a toilet.97 A tribal
jail lacked potable water.98 In Allegheny County, Pennsylvania, where the
average detainee spends sixty-one days, a restraint chair was used for those
with mental illness.99 In Fulton County, Georgia, the jail’s inability to cope
with mentally ill inmates led to placing them in solitary, sometimes with

(Feb. 8, 2010), https://www.facebook.com/notes/cuyahoga-county-sheriff/faqscuyahoga-county-correction-center-the-jail/316139511063 (“The average length of stay for
the Pre-Trial inmate is fifty days . . . .”)
87
DEP’T OF JUST., U.S. MARSHALS SERV., QUALITY ASSURANCE REVIEW: FACILITY
REVIEW REPORT OF CUYAHOGA CNTY. CORR. CTR., 3-4, 35 (2018).
88
Id. at 41.
89
Id. at 3, 42.
90
Id. at 3.
91
Id. at 3-4.
92
Id. at 31.
93
Id. at 24.
94
Id.
95
Id. at 34.
96
Nolan Clay, Bedbugs, Moldy Showers: Dozens of Health Violations Found at
Troubled Oklahoma County Jail, OKLAHOMAN (Mar. 31, 2021, 11:14 AM),
https://www.oklahoman.com/story/news/2021/03/30/oklahoma-county-jail-has-dozenhealth-violations-inspectors-say/4807430001.
97
VanSickle & Villa, supra note 85.
98
Nate Hegyi, Indian Affairs Promised to Reform Tribal Jails. We Found Death, Neglect
and
Disrepair,
NPR
(June
10,
2021,
5:06
AM),
https://www.npr.org/2021/06/10/1002451637/bureau-of-indian-affairs-tribal-detentioncenters-deaths-neglect.
99
Juliette Rihl, “It Always Escalated to the Chair”: Allegheny County Jail Used the
Restraint Chair More Than Any Other County Jail in PA, PUB. SOURCE (Mar. 6, 2021),
https://www.publicsource.org/restraint-chair-allegheny-county-jail-mental-health.
FACEBOOK
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horrific results.100 One woman, charged with misdemeanor trespassing, was
kept in isolation for over four months, and was denied clean clothes and the
opportunity to bathe.101
Her condition declined and she required
102
hospitalization.
Women in Muskegon County Jail in Michigan sued for,
among other things, being placed in cells covered in urine and vomit, being
watched by male guards while they had to strip naked in order to use the
toilet, and being denied feminine hygiene products.103 The pandemic has
exacerbated the horrors of confinement in jails as well.104
To be sure, some of these conditions are in violation of the detainees’
constitutional rights.105 They are the easy cases. The question to ask,
however, is how the state should treat those who are presumed innocent. We
certainly could not sequester you, our hypothetical juror, in a jail like these.
So, unless it is appropriate to get a head start on punishment (and it is not),106
why would we be entitled to subject the presumed innocent to such
dehumanizing conditions?
4. Critiques of Bail and Pretrial Detention
Just as current conditions of pretrial confinement draw criticism, so,
too, do our current bail and pretrial detention practices and procedures. The
use of money bail and pretrial detention is prevalent. Sandy Mayson notes,
“[S]ince 1990, both pretrial detention rates and the use of money bail have
risen steeply; it is likely that we now detain millions of people each year for
their inability to post even small amounts of bail.”107 Who is released prior
to trial on felony charges is highly variable. As Shima Baradaran-Baughman
observes, “Some counties report as low as a 30 percent release rate, and others

100

Hannah Riley, Judge Grants Injunction to Halt Solitary Confinement and to Remedy
“Repulsive” Conditions for Women at South Fulton Jail, S. CTR. FOR HUM. RTS. (July 25,
2019), https://www.schr.org/judge-grants-injunction-to-halt-solitary-confinement-and-toremedy-repulsive-conditions-for-women-at-south-fulton-jail.
101
Id.
102
Id.
103
Abuse and Neglect at Muskegon County Jail, ACLU: MICH.,
https://www.aclumich.org/en/abuse-and-neglect-muskegon-county-jail (last visited Jan. 19,
2022).
104
Rebecca Rhynhard, Opinion, Philly’s Shockingly Inhumane Prison Conditions,
PHILA.
INQUIRER
(Oct.
6,
2021),
https://www.inquirer.com/opinion/commentary/philadelphia-prisons-correctional-officershortage-20211006.html.
105
For a survey of the jurisprudence and a proposed standard, see generally, Catherine
T. Struve, The Conditions of Pretrial Detention, 161 U. PA. L. REV. 1009 (2013).
106
See infra Section I.B.1.b.
107
Sandra G. Mayson, Dangerous Defendants, 127 YALE L.J. 490, 507 (2018).
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release up to 90 percent of those arrested.”108
Scholars criticize our bail and detention practices on procedural,
substantive, and distributional grounds. Procedurally, some scholars object
that the use of the pending charge is antithetical to the presumption of
innocence.109 In addition, the brevity of bail hearings is objectionable.110
Substantively, scholars argue that pretrial detention causes more harm
than is typically understood. Defendants who are not held pretrial have been
found to have more bargaining power.111 Detainees can lose jobs, be attacked
or sexually assaulted in custody, and have their family lives disrupted.112
Third-party harms also occur, such as those to a detainee’s children, caused
by her absence.113 Detention pressures defendants to plead guilty because
confinement is so dreadful.114 Perhaps most shockingly, “pretrial detention
is the single best predictor of case outcome, even after controlling for other
factors.”115 One study in the federal system found that pretrial release
decreases sentencing length by 67.5%, increases the probability of a belowguidelines sentence by 56.2%, decreases the probability of receiving a
mandatory minimum by 36.5%, and increases the chances of receiving a
sentencing reduction for assisting the government by 32.7%.116 In other
words, detention has profound negative impacts. Scholars thus contend that
108

SHIMA BARADARAN BAUGHMAN, THE BAIL BOOK: A COMPREHENSIVE LOOK AT
BAIL IN AMERICA’S CRIMINAL JUSTICE SYSTEM 62 (2018).
109
Id. at 31 (“Contrary to a presumption of innocence, denial of bail and liberty results
in unconstitutional punishment.”).
110
SCOTT-HAYWARD & FRADELLA, supra note 75, at 38 (surveying studies and finding
“little evidence” that bail hearings are long or contested).
111
Will Dobbie, Jacob Goldin & Crystal S. Yang, The Effects of Pretrial Detention on
Conviction, Future Crime, and Employment: Evidence from Randomly Assigned Judges, 108
AM. ECON. REV. 201, 203 (2018) (“[I]nitial pretrial release affects case outcomes primarily
through a strengthening of defendants’ bargaining positions before trial, particularly for
defendants charged with less serious crimes and with no prior offenses”).
112
BARADARAN BAUGHMAN, supra note 108, at 86.
113
Id. at 88-89.
114
Time served plays a role in the plea. Leslie & Pope, supra note 85, at 552 (“One
relevant feature of the criminal justice system is that detainees who are ultimately convicted
and sentenced to serve time have the time they spent awaiting adjudication counted against
their sentences. This policy lowers the cost of pleading guilty for detainees relative to
released defendants because detainees have paid part of the price of conviction already.”).
115
SCOTT-HAYWARD & FRADELLA, supra note 75, at 5; Heaton, Mayson, and Stevenson,
supra note 17, at 715 (finding in empirical study of misdemeanor cases that “pretrial
detention causally increases the likelihood of conviction, the likelihood of receiving a
carceral sentence, the length of a carceral sentence, and the likelihood of future arrest for
new crimes.”); see also Leslie & Pope, supra note 85, at 530, 547 (finding that pretrial
detention increases the probability of conviction by 13% for felony offenses and 7.4% for
misdemeanors).
116
Stephanie Holmes Didwania, The Immediate Consequences of Federal Pretrial
Detention, 22 AM. L. & ECON. REV. 24, 45 tbl.4, 46 (2020).
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if the Supreme Court views itself as trading off the interests of the accused
against the interests of society, the Court is getting the math wrong.117
Distributionally, because the rich can more easily make bail than the
poor, bail essentially detains the poor.118 Very few defendants are denied bail
outright.119 However, since the poor cannot afford their bail, some scholars
have argued that we are essentially punishing poverty.120 Detentions are also
racially unjust. Data suggest that Black defendants are detained at a rate of
three times that of white defendants.121 The outcry over the link between
race, poverty, and detention has led to bail reform within some
jurisdictions,122 and innovative workarounds in others, such as communities
paying for bail.123

See also Stevenson & Mayson, supra note 20, at 7 (demonstrating “that a rigorous
consequentialist analysis raises deep questions about how the law ought to value individual
liberty and welfare”); Yang, supra note 20, at 1407 (conducting “a partial cost-benefit
analysis that incorporates the best available evidence on both the costs and benefits of
detention, [and] finding that on the margin, pre-trial detention imposes far larger costs than
benefits”).
118
BARADARAN BAUGHMAN, supra note 108, at 2. (“Poor defendants, who have
committed minor, nonviolent crimes, are held in jail before trial while rich defendants
charged with serious and sometimes violent crimes are released pending trial.”); id. (“[T]he
story of bail is one of poverty, inequality, and haste. . . . [B]ail is the single most preventable
cause of mass incarceration in America.”); Nick Pinto, The Bail Trap, N.Y. TIMES (Aug. 13,
2015), https://www.nytimes.com/2015/08/16/magazine/the-bail-trap.html (“In New York
City, where courts use bail far less than in many jurisdictions, roughly 45,000 people are
jailed each year simply because they can’t pay their court-assigned bail.”).
119
BRIAN A. REAVES, U.S. DEP’T OF JUST., BUREAU OF JUST. STAT., NCJ 243777,
FELONY DEFENDANTS IN LARGE URBAN COUNTIES, 2009 – STATISTICAL TABLES, at 15
(2013), https://bjs.ojp.gov/content/pub/pdf/fdluc09.pdf (calculating that 4% of defendants
were denied bail outright and 45% of murder defendants were denied bail outright); Mayson,
supra note 60, at 1649-54 (describing “the current incoherence in bail practice: we carefully
limit the explicit denial of bail but impose no limits on the functional denial of bail”).
120
As Baradaran Baughman argues:
Following this logic, there is a compelling government interest in preventing crime
that is more important than an individual’s due process interest. But when an
individual can be released safely with some supervision or restrictions, then
incarceration is just serving as punishment and should not be required. And when
there is excessive delay between arrest and trial, and thus a longer period of
detention, the distinction between pretrial detention and punishment is a mere
façade.
BARADARAN BAUGHMAN, supra note 108, 31-32.
121
ZENG & MINTON, supra note 2, at 1.
122
See Diana Dabruzzo, New Jersey Set out to Reform its Cash Bail System. Now, the
Results
Are
in.,
ARNOLD
VENTURES
(Nov.
14,
2019),
https://www.arnoldventures.org/stories/new-jersey-set-out-to-reform-its-cash-bail-systemnow-the-results-are-in.
123
See Jocelyn Simonson, Bail Nullification, 115 MICH. L. REV. 585 (2017).
117

Electronic copy available at: https://ssrn.com/abstract=4041973

The Trouble with Time Served

19

We are in the third generation of bail reform. First reformers focused
on inappropriately holding poor defendants.124 The second set of reforms
was a profound public shift, with an “unmistakable public safety focus.”125
Now, the third generation of bail reform focuses on “the prospect of
‘moneyballing’ pretrial decisionmaking.”126
Issues remain. Renewed emphasis on risk assessment requires us to
figure out the degree of risk that justifies detention.127 Scholars recognize
that even these dangerousness assessments are far from perfect. Baradaran
Baughman notes that since “there is no perfect decision in pretrial detention,
and judges are largely doing a quick uninformed cost-benefit determination
in each bail decision anyway, a proper consideration of these costs and
benefits is in order.”128
In addition, although objective risk factors are lauded for not relying
on the pure discretionary decisions of individual decisionmakers, risk
assessment tools raise issues about gender and racial equity.129 As Mayson’s
title pithily summarizes, “bias in, bias out.”130 Not only are there objections
to how we are detaining, but how many we are detaining.131 Detention is
costly.132
Thus, this third wave of bail reform may resolve some procedural
problems, such as judges making gestalt-based decisions about detention, and
some distributive problems, such as requiring money bail from those who
cannot afford it, but there remain two highly problematic issues on the
124
John S. Goldkamp, Danger and Detention: A Second Generation of Bail Reform, 76
J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 1, 3 (1985) (noting bail critique for wealth disparities).
125
Id. at 6.
126
Lauryn P. Gouldin, Defining Flight Risk, 85 U. CHI. L. REV. 677, 716, 681 (2018)
(“There is widespread enthusiasm for the prospect of “moneyballing” pretrial
decisionmaking.”); see also Mayson, supra note 107, at 515 (“The most recent reform model
envisions actuarial risk assessment as the basis for pretrial release and custody decisions.
Money bail is not to be used to mitigate danger.”) (footnotes omitted).
127
Mayson, supra note 107, at 496 (“The adoption of risk assessment will require
stakeholders to consider what degree of risk justifies restraint, moreover, because the new
statistical methodology makes the question unavoidable in a way that it was not before.”).
128
BARADARAN BAUGHMAN, supra note 108, at 91.
129
Cf. id. at 72 (“The fact is men are much more likely to be rearrested pretrial than
women, but risk predictions tools typically leave gender out of their formula.”) and id. (“risk
assessments can be racially inequitable by giving more weight to certain facts that, although
unrelated to race per se, are racially disparate”).
130
Sandra G. Mayson, Bias In, Bias Out, 128 YALE L.J. 2218, 2234-58 (2019) (noting
algorithmic risk assessment will have a disparate racial impact because the inputs are
backward looking on a racially stratified world, with disproportionate enforcement, and
where different crimes are committed by different demographics).
131
BARADARAN BAUGHMAN, supra note 108, at 75 (detailing research that only 1.9
percent of state felony defendants released are reoffending).
132
Id. ch 5.
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reformer’s own terms. First, we have yet to answer the question of where to
draw the line on “dangerousness” that authorizes detention. After all, having
an accurate thermometer is useless unless you know what the target
temperature is. Second, these metrics will inevitably embed distributive
inequalities, even if they are not as patently obvious as the inability to pay
money bail.
B. Credit for Time Served
What happens to pretrial detainees? If convicted, they will get credit
for time served. As the New York statute simply states, “An inmate is entitled
to have all time spent in custody on a criminal charge credited to the sentence
that the inmate receives upon conviction of that charge.”133 The federal
government and every state provide for credit for time served by statute, rule,
or case law.134 Ankle bracelets and home detention do not count as
confinement;135 however, a wide range of custodial arrangements do. For
instance, California’s statute gives credit “when the defendant has been in
custody, including, but not limited to, any time spent in a jail, camp, work
furlough facility, halfway house, rehabilitation facility, hospital, prison,
juvenile detention facility, or similar residential institution.”136 In Delaware,
Iowa, Maryland, New Jersey, North Carolina, North Dakota, and Texas,
being confined for psychiatric treatment counts for such credit by statute.137
Time-served provisions vary in the timing of initial adoption.
Pennsylvania had a law on the books by 1937.138 New Jersey provided for
time served for pretrial detention by 1953.139 The first federal provision came
133

N.Y. PENAL LAW §70.30(3) (West 2021).
See supra note 11.
135
Bush v. State, 2 S.W.3d 761 (Ark. 1999) (holding that a defendant enrolled in a home
detention program with electronic monitoring was not entitled to credit at sentencing); State
v. Higgins, 593 S.E.2d 180 (S.C. Ct. App. 2004) (house arrest did not count for purposes of
time served).
136
CAL. PENAL CODE § 2900.5 (West 2021).
137
DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 11, § 3901(c) (West 2021) ("in an institution under involuntary
restraint”); IOWA CODE § 903A.5(1) (2022) (“other correctional or mental facility”); MD.
CODE ANN., CRIM. PROC. § 6-218(b)(1) (West 2021) (“hospital [or] facility for persons with
mental disorders”); N.J. CT. R. 3:21-8(a) (“state hospital”); N.C. GEN. STAT. § 15-196.1
(2020) (“confinement in any State or local correctional, mental or other institution”); N.D.
CENT. CODE § 12.1-32-02(2) (2021) (“mental institution”); TEX. CODE CRIM. PROC. art.
42.03(2)(a)(3) (“mental health facility”) (West 2021); see also People v. Gravlin, 217
N.W.2d 404 (Mich. 1974) (holding that a defendant confined in a mental hospital was
entitled to credit for subsequent sentence).
138
Act 283 of 1937, 1937 Pa. Laws 1036, §§ 1–3 (codified as amended at 42 PA. CONS.
STAT. § 9760 (2021)).
139
N.J. R. 3:7-10(g), in SUP. CT. OF N.J., REVISION OF THE RULES GOVERNING THE
COURTS OF THE STATE OF NEW JERSEY 176-77 (1953).
134
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in 1960,140 and the Model Penal Code provided for credit for time served by
the end of that decade.141 The next twenty-five years saw a flurry of statutory
adoptions.142
The rationales for adoption also varied. One underlying assumption
is that pretrial detention is punishment-like, even when drafters are unwilling
to state that assumption explicitly. For instance, the Model Penal Code
Commentaries note, “The unfavorable conditions that frequently characterize
such presentence detention emphasize the justice of this requirement.”143
Another concern was equal treatment: Although the federal provision
originally only provided for credit towards sentences with a mandatory
minimum,144 Congress expanded the provision in the Bail Reform Act of
1966 as it saw no principled reason for restricting credit to sentences with
mandatory minimums.145 Cost savings could also have been a factor because
140

Act of Sept. 2, 1960, Pub. L. No. 86-691, 74 Stat. 738 (codified as amended at 18
U.S.C. § 3585). S. 2932, 86th Cong. (1960) and H.R. 12208, 86th Cong. (1960) were
introduced in 1960 to credit time “spent in custody for want of bail.” See H.R. REP. NO. 862058 (1960); S. REP. NO. 86-1696 (1960). According to the House and Senate Judiciary
committee,
The primary purpose of the bill is to eliminate the disparity in sentences under
certain statutes requiring mandatory terms of imprisonment. Under existing law a
person charged with violating a statute requiring the imposition of a minimum
mandatory sentence may not be credited with the time spent in custody for want of
bail while awaiting trial. The result is that a sentencing court lacks authority to
differentiate between the offender who has been free on bail before trial and one
who has been in custody, because it is required to impose the same minimum
mandatory sentence to each.
H.R. REP. NO. 86-2058, at 2 (1960). [S. REP. NO. 86-1696, at 2 (1960)]. The Senate bill
was passed that September. See 74 Stat. 738.
141
MODEL PENAL CODE § 7.09 (AM. L. INST. 1962).
142
E.g., Act No. 58, § 1 1975 Ala. Laws 185 (codified as amended at ALA. CODE § 1518-5 (2021)); Act of Dec. 14, 1971, § 2, 1971 Cal. Stat. 3683, 3686, ch. 1732 (codified as
amended at CAL. PENAL CODE § 2900.5 (West 2021)); Act of July 20, 1965, § 70.30(3), 1965
N.Y. Laws 2343, 2370, ch. 1030 (codified as amended at N.Y. PENAL LAW § 70.30(3)
(McKinney 2021)); Act of May 16, 1978, § 9, 1977 Wis. Sess. Laws 1362, 1364-65, ch. 353
(codified as amended at WIS. STAT. § 973.155 (2019–20)).
143
MODEL PENAL CODE § 7.09, cmt. 1 at 308 (AM. L. INST., Official Draft and Revised
Commentaries 1985).
144
See Act of Sept. 2, 1960, Pub. L. No. 86-691, 74 Stat. 738 (crediting time served only
“where the statute requires the imposition of a minimum mandatory sentence”).
145
“The Attorney General shall give any such person credit toward service of his
sentence for any days spent in custody in connection with the offense or acts for which
sentence was imposed.” Bail Reform Act of 1966, Pub. L. No. 89-465, § 4, 80 Stat. 214, 217.
As the Senate Judiciary Report on the bill explained, “It is ironic that persons accused of
such serious crimes should be assured of receiving credit for pretrial custody, while those
convicted of less serious crimes for which no minimum mandatory sentence is required have
the benefit of no such assurance.” S. COMM. ON THE JUDICIARY, BAIL REFORM ACT OF 1965,
S. REP. NO. 80-750, at 21 (1965).
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states get to count the pretrial detention time as punishment, thereby avoiding
paying for the later imprisonment. Wisconsin’s bill analysis included a fiscal
impact statement noting a potential savings of $1,163,000 a year in 1977.146
Although this estimate was later revised because Health and Social Services
had already been giving such credit in practice, it is nevertheless notable that
any jurisdiction that looked at the math would be motivated to give credit.
The savings were $5.3 million dollars by today’s standards,147 and our
confinement numbers are substantially in excess of what they were in the
seventies.
The development of federal law, along with evolving Supreme Court
Equal Protection jurisprudence, likely initiated further adoptions. In 1970,
the Court decided Williams v. Illinois, wherein an indigent defendant was
required to serve additional time because of his inability to pay a fine.148
However, this additional time in addition to the imprisonment already
ordered exceeded the maximum sentence.149 The Court held, “The Equal
Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment requires that the statutory
ceiling placed on imprisonment for any substantive offense be the same for
all defendants irrespective of their economic status.”150
In the wake of Williams, numerous courts determined that credit for
time served is constitutionally required. The constitutional claim is most
frequently grounded in the equal protection clause of the federal

146

S. DOCS. ON S. 159, 1977–78 Sess. at 55 (Wis. 1977) (on file with author).
US INFLATION CALCULATOR (last visited Jan. 11, 2022) (type “1977” into the “If in”
box; then, type “2022” in the “then in” box; then, type “1163000” in the “I purchased an item
for $” box; and then click “Calculate”).
148
Williams v. Illinois, 399 U.S. 235, 236-37 (1970).
149
Id.
150
Id. at 244.
147
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constitution,151 though courts also endorse double jeopardy reasoning152 or
rely on their own state constitutions.153 Some jurisdictions limit their claims
to when the time in pretrial confinement and the post-conviction sentence
would together exceed the maximum sentence for the crime,154 whereas other
151

E.g., State v. Sutton, 521 P.2d 1008, 1010 (Ariz. Ct. App. 1974) (reasoning that a
failure to credit presentence confinement to a maximum sentence amounts to a denial of
equal protection required by the Fourteenth Amendment); Smith v. State, 508 S.W.2d 54, 57
(Ark. 1974) (reasoning that there is no rational basis for discriminating between two
prisoners charged with the same crime, where one can post bond and the other cannot due to
indigency, and thus denial of credit in these instances violates the Equal Protection Clause
of the Fourteenth Amendment); In re Young, 107 Cal. Rptr. 915, 918 (Cal. Ct. App. 1973)
(finding that presentence confinement for those financially unable to post bail, leading to
disparities in confinement length of individuals convicted of the same offense, constitutes an
invidious discrimination that violates the Equal Protection clause of the Fourteenth
Amendment); Mallory v. State, 281 N.E.2d 860, 861-62 (Ohio Ct. Com. Pl. 1972) (granting
credit for presentence commitment due to financial inability to post bond and reasoning that
a failure to grant credit in this instance would violate the Equal Protection Clause of the
Fourteenth Amendment); State v. Green, 524 N.W.2d 613, 615 (S.D. 1994) (holding that the
Equal Protection clause of the Fourteenth Amendment requires that credit be awarded for all
presentence custody resulting from indigency and inability to post bail); In re Mota, 788 P.2d
538, 540, 543 (Wash. 1990) (en banc) (reasoning that a deprivation of liberty due to
indigency triggers intermediate scrutiny analysis and failure to credit indigent defendants for
presentence confinement does not further a substantial state interest, thus violating the Equal
Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment); Klimas v. State, 249 N.W.2d 285, 288
(Wis. 1977) (reasoning that denying indigent individuals jail time credit for a sentence less
than a maximum sentence imposed also violates the Equal Protection Clause because it
invidiously discriminates against indigent prisoners); Gomez v. State, 85 P.3d 417, 421
(Wyo. 2004) (credit for time served must be given to indigent prisoners to comport with
equal protection).
152
E.g., Culp v. Bounds, 325 F. Supp. 416, 419 (W.D.N.C. 1971) (holding that North
Carolina’s denial of credit for pre-sentence commitment due to an indigent defendant’s
inability to post bond violates the Double Jeopardy clause or, alternatively, constitutes
unconstitutional discrimination on the basis of wealth, violating the Equal Protection Clause
of the Fourteenth Amendment).
153
E.g., Martin v. Leverette, 244 S.E.2d 39, 41-42 (W. Va. 1978) (choosing to anchor
credit requirements for presentence jail time when the defendant is unable to post bail for
indigency in the West Virginia Constitution’s Equal Protection and Double Jeopardy
clauses).
154
Sutton, 521 P.2d at 1010 (addressing addition to maximum sentence); Gelis v. State,
287 So. 2d 368, 369 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1973) (per curiam) (“[O]ne sentenced to a maximum
term must be given credit for time spent in jail awaiting trial where the pre-trial detention
was a consequence of the prisoner's indigency.”); Jimerson v. State, 957 S.W.2d 875, 876
(Tex. App. 1997) (“When a defendant receives the maximum sentence authorized, the equal
protection clause of the Fourteenth Amendment requires that he receive credit for pretrial
jail time.”); Hart v. Henderson, 449 F.2d 183, 185 (5th Cir. 1971) (finding that a denial of
credit for pre-sentence jail time against maximum sentences is constitutionally impermissible
when a defendant is financially unable to make bond); Jackson v. State of Alabama, 530 F.2d
1231, 1236-37 (5th Cir. 1976) (holding that while there is no absolute constitutional right to
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jurisdictions reason that any sentence that ultimately leads to more time in
confinement for the poor than the rich is constitutionally problematic.155
In the context of these constitutional claims, some courts are explicit
that the concern is the total amount of confinement, not punishment,156
whereas others take pretrial detention to be punishment.157 One court opined:
We find no merit in the argument sometimes advanced that presentence
jail time should not be credited because it is not ‘punishment.’ Whatever
it may be called, it is certainly a deprivation of liberty, which, in itself, is
punishment to most human beings. We should not like to try to convince
those held in such confinement, along with those undergoing punishment,
of the soundness of such an argument. We reject it, as other courts
have . . . .158
Though it is dubious that such a claim would survive the Supreme
Court’s current jurisprudence, it will not be tested because federal law now
provides for credit for time served across the board.
Of course, this constitutional concession is too little, too late. The
true distinction is drawn not at the time that the rich versus poor defendant is
sentenced, but at the time that the rich man is released and the poor man is
detained. Occasionally, courts come to grips with this problematic feature:
Whether bail, once set, can be posted is dependent on the defendant's
financial ability, but this implicit discrimination between the rich and the
poor is tolerable in light of the state's overriding need to produce all
pre-sentence credit, when the defendant is unable to post bail due to indigency and sentenced
to the maximum sentence, he is entitled to credit for pre-sentence jail time); Hall v. Furlong,
77 F.3d 361, 364 (10th Cir. 1996) (It is impermissible, under the Equal Protection Clause, to
require that indigents serve sentences greater than the maximum provided by statute solely
by reason of their indigency).
155
Smith, 508 S.W.2d at 57; Klimas, 249 N.W.2d at 288 (explicitly extending earlier
case law to reach sentences that are less than the maximum); Johnson v. Prast, 548 F.2d 699,
702 (7th Cir. 1977) (holding that the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment
requires pre-sentence jail time to be credited against all sentences for indigent defendants
who were unable to post bond); King, 516 F.2d at 323-24 (ruling that the Equal Protection
clause can be violated for sentences less than the maximum).
156
Sutton, 521 P.2d at 1010 (“In short, we hold that while presentence incarceration may
not qualify as ‘punishment’ under A.R.S. § 13–1652, it amounts to an infringement of
freedom and deprivation of liberty and when added to the maximum deprivation of liberty
allowed by law results in a denial of equal protection guaranteed by the 14th Amendment of
the United States Constitution.”).
157
Culp, 325 F. Supp. at 419 (declaring pretrial detention and post-trial incarceration to
constitute “multiple punishments for the same offense”).
158
Smith, 508 S.W.2d at 57 (citations omitted).
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defendants, rich or poor, at trial. Once the trial has been held, however,
and the defendant found guilty, that particular overriding need of the state
which may impel confinement prior to trial is at an end. There is no
constitutionally sufficient reason to permit the pre-trial discrimination on
the basis of wealth to go unrectified, if it is at all possible to do so. The
obvious method of rectifying the inequality is to credit the preconviction
time in partial fulfillment of the sentence imposed upon conviction.159
Ultimately, then, poor defendants who are convicted have the wrong
of disparate treatment rectified by credit for time served. Now, in the wake
of statutes that give credit to all defendants, rich defendants who are detained
also get credit. However, poor defendants, who cannot afford bail but whose
charges are dismissed or who are found not guilty, do not have this
discrimination remedied.
One final wrinkle in the legal relationship between pretrial detention
and credit for time served is that jurisdictions may make defendants pay the
costs of their own incapacitation.160 These fees can be crippling for the
indigent, who leave in debt, and rarely cost-justified for the state because
defendants can’t afford the fees anyway.161 These fees have been deemed

159

Klimas, 249 N.W.2d at 287-88.
E.g., OKLA. STAT. tit. 22, § 979a. Actual numbers are difficult to gather. For
instance, NPR found forty-one states with pay-to-stay programs, but did not distinguish
between pretrial detention and post-conviction incarceration. State-by-State Court Fees,
NPR (May 19, 2014, 4:02 PM), https://www.npr.org/2014/05/19/312455680/state-by-statecourt-fees. And as one exemplar of the parsing difficulties, a recent University of Chicago
Law Review article cited Wisconsin for both (1) charging pretrial detainees, and (2) not
differentiating between those convicted and those who are not. Duffy & Hynes, supra note
20, at 1341 n.201, 1342 n.205 (2021) (referencing WIS. STAT. § 302.372(2)(a) (2019–20)).
Yet, the statute is ambiguous as to the former point, and a discussion of actual practice in
one case indicated that the county had a new policy (in 2013) of not charging for pretrial
detention as well as a longstanding policy of refunding fees for those who were not convicted.
Barnes v. Brown County, No. 11-00968, 2013 WL 1314015, at *1, 2 (E.D. Wis. Mar. 30,
2013). With the intermingling of jails and prisons in our nomenclature, the different statuses
of the incarcerees, and the ability of any given county’s practice to vary in reality, it would
be a daunting empirical project to map our actual practices. Suffice it to say, however, that
those who are detained pretrial may also be billed room and board.
161
Joseph Shapiro, As Court Fees Rise, the Poor Are Paying the Price, NPR (May 19,
2014, 4:02 PM), https://www.npr.org/2014/05/19/312158516/increasing-court-fees-punishthe-poor (finding hundreds of people who were jailed for failure to pay court debts); Steven
Hale, Pretrial Detainees Are Being Billed for Their Stay in Jail, THE APPEAL (July 20, 2018),
https://theappeal.org/pretrial-detainees-are-being-billed-for-their-stay-in-jail (“The city’s
pretrial fees were both punitive and hardly worth the trouble in financial terms. During a
three-year period ending in 2017, Nashville collected just $533,873.42 of the $11,411,448.55
in pretrial jail fees billed to defendants. So, the city simply saddled thousands of low-income
residents with debt while collecting little in the way of revenue.”).
160
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constitutional by at least one court as a “reasonable user fee.”162
****
Pretrial detention is authorized to prevent flight, obstruction, and
dangerousness. The Supreme Court has blessed the expansion of detention
rationales from failure to appear to dangerousness, while maintaining that
harsh detention conditions are not punishment. Scholars have been critical
of where our standards are set and of whom they impact the most.
Simultaneously, far less appreciated is the granting of time-served
credit to convicted detainees. Spurred by concerns about equal treatment of
rich and poor defendants, cost savings, and the conditions of confinement,
our criminal justice practices do count preventive detention as punishment.
Both practices call out for a more sustained analysis of two questions:
First, how does pretrial detention relate to our rights? Second, how is time
served responsive to those detention rationales? It is to those questions we
now turn.
II.

JUSTIFYING DETENTION

To this point, I have set forth the constitutional and legal guardrails.
But these legal positions presuppose underlying moral justifications for
pretrial detention. Even if we can easily tick off the purported reasons (risk
of flight, obstruction, and dangerousness), we need to dig deeper to unpack
precisely what it would be about a risk of flight that would justify detaining
someone. Or, what precisely do we mean in saying that we can lock someone
up based on “dangerousness?” This Part seeks to unearth the moral
justifications that could potentially ungird the law’s purported detention
rationales. As we will see, some reasons are stronger than others.
A. Unavoidable Errors and Unjust Detentions
At the outset, we should face the reality that it is undoubtedly true that
we mistakenly or unjustly detain criminal defendants. These problematic
cases can be separated into unavoidable errors and substantively unjust
detentions.
As I discuss below, we may ask the right questions and have the right
epistemic burdens and still get the wrong answers. The criminal justice
system can make mistakes. These mistakes are unlikely to be identified in
the case of pretrial detention because the mistake preempts the proof to the
162

Slade v. Hampton Rds. Reg'l Jail, 407 F.3d 243, 254 (4th Cir. 2005).
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contrary. That is, if you are worried the defendant will flee and you lock him
up, you can never test the counterfactual where he actually does not flee if
you release him on his own recognizance. Even a perfectly functioning
system will have this sort of mistake.
But we also have detentions that are simply unjust. We are making
substantive mistakes in our laws and our applications. We fail to focus upon,
and attend with precision to, what would justify detaining someone. Ordering
money bail on a misdemeanor when the defendant lacks the ability to pay is
simply unjust. It shows a failure to attend to reasonable alternatives, to take
into account how exacting the bail should be, and to truly ask whether a
misdemeanor charge could justify putting someone in jail. As I discuss what
does justify detention below, I do not wish to be misunderstood as suggesting
that all or most of our current practices are justified. As will be seen, we need
to be far more exacting when we ask why we are detaining someone, and it
may very well be that most of our detention practices are not morally justified
at all.
B. Dangerousness
The main argument given for detention these days is
dangerousness.163 Notice that dangerousness is forward looking. We detain
individuals to prevent them from committing completely different crimes.
What would ground our ability to interfere with someone’s liberty because
she might commit a future offense? Here, there are two answers. First, the
defendant may have forfeited a right against this preventive interference.
Second, we may be overriding the defendant’s rights for the greater good.
Let me briefly clarify what I mean by a forfeiture account. The idea
is simply that no right stands in the way of the action taken against the
defendant.164 If Alice tries to kill Bob, she is not wronged if Bob defends
himself, even with deadly force. If Carla commits arson, she is not wronged
if she is imprisoned for six months because she deserves it. Generally, one
can understand the amount of this forfeiture through the concept of
proportionality.165 Although theorists often capture this idea in different
ways—some may say the defendant is liable, others will say he has a duty,
and still others may say that one simply has no right against force
proportionate to one’s wrongdoing—the idea is that the defendant has done
163

See supra Parts I.A.1 and 2.
See, e.g., MCMAHAN, supra note 22, at 10 (“To attack someone who is liable to be
attacked is neither to violate nor to infringe that person’s right, for the person’s being liable
to attack just is his having forfeited his right not to be attacked in the circumstances.”).
165
HELEN FROWE, DEFENSIVE KILLING 118 (2014) (noting that determining how much
force one is liable to is to ask how much force is proportionate).
164
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something impermissible such that she is not wronged by the responsive harm
that is imposed on her.166
Overriding accounts, in contrast, do not depend on the loss of the
defendant’s right, but instead take the defendant’s right to be overridden by
more weighty considerations.167 When we override someone’s rights for the
greater good, we owe them compensation.168 This principle is not only
embodied in the constitutional conception of takings but also in private law
doctrine, such as when the boat owner had to pay for the justified damage to
the dock in Vincent v. Lake Erie Transportation Co..169
1. Forfeiture and Detention
Let’s start with forfeiture accounts. It is crucial to distinguish two
sorts of forfeiture claims that may be at work when we rely on the amorphous
concept of dangerousness. The first claim would be that the defendant’s
commission of the charged offense forfeits his rights. To illustrate, our ability
to incarcerate someone on incapacitation grounds is thought to follow from
his being found guilty of the crime charged. The second claim would be that
the defendant’s intent to commit a future crime is itself sufficient to forfeit
rights. As an example, if you are pointing a gun at Juan and I shoot you in
the leg to stop you from killing him, it is your decision to pose a culpable
threat that justifies the use of force. It is decidedly unclear what is doing the
work in our actual pretrial detention practices, but let’s at least endeavor to
get the theory straight.
a. Desert-based dangerousness detention
Are we allowed to detain individuals as dangerous because they have
committed the crime with which they are charged? Let’s call this idea desertbased dangerousness detention. This immediately leads to the question of
166

Compare MCMAHAN, supra note 22, at 10 (using liability and forfeiture) with Victor
Tadros, Causation, Culpability, and Liability, in THE ETHICS OF SELF-DEFENSE 113-18
(Christian Coons & Michael Weber eds., 2016) (arguing for a more capacious account
including the existence of duties).
167
Judith Jarvis Thomson, Self-Defense and Rights, reprinted in RIGHTS, RESTITUTION,
AND RISK: ESSAYS IN MORAL THEORY 33, 42-43 (William Parent, ed. 1986); Frederick
Schauer, Rightful Deprivation of Rights 4 (Univ. of Va. Sch. of L. Pub. L. & Legal Theory
Rsch. Paper 2018-43, 2018), https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=3221184
(“It is commonplace among philosophers that rights may be overridden.”).
168
See infra Section IV.B.2 (defending this compensatory right).
169
124 N.W. 221 (Minn. 1910); see also Schauer, supra note 167, at 14-15 (noting that
the Fifth Amendment and Vincent v. Lake Erie are standard examples of the need to
compensate after overriding a right).
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whether this detention somehow flouts the presumption of innocence.170 If
the defendant is thought to be innocent of the crime charged, how can it give
us grounds to incapacitate him to prevent him from committing another
offense?
Detaining that is justified by the defendant’s guilt for the crime
charged undermines our procedural morality, even if it does not undermine
the presumption of innocence as understood in U.S. law. 171 If we have trials
for the purpose of determining what negative consequences follow from the
defendant’s having committed the crime, then we must first determine that
the defendant has actually committed the crime. A claim that potential guilt
for the commission of the offense itself grounds some sort of forfeiture or
lesser standing undermines the entire purpose of the criminal process.172
Simply put, the state may not get a head start on punishment before the
defendant is even convicted.
b.

Defense-based dangerousness detention

In contrast to a forfeiture that is grounded in the defendant’s having
committed an offense, we might think that defendants can forfeit rights
because of the offenses they plan to commit. This is, after all, what selfdefense and defense of others authorize—the use of force to stop an
individual from committing an act.
Let’s call this defense-based
dangerousness detention.
This is a defensive/preemptive rationale. To see its contours, let’s
take a step back and work through the requirements for self-defense. We
typically think of self-defense in the individual context as governed by
proportionality, necessity, and imminence concerns.173 For proportionality,
170

Shima Baradaran, The Presumption of Punishment, 8 CRIM. L. & PHIL. 391, 401-02
(2014) (arguing that the presumption of innocence and due process forbid pretrial weighing
of the evidence against the defendant); R.A. Duff, Pre-Trial Detention and the Presumption
of Innocence, in PREVENTION AND THE LIMITS OF THE CRIMINAL LAW 115, 119 (Andrew
Ashworth, Lucia Zedner and Patrick Tomlin, eds. 2013) (asking whether pretrial detention
is compatible with the presumption of innocence).
171
That said, it does not technically violate the legal presumption of innocence. Bell v.
Wolfish, 441 U.S. 520 (1979); LARRY LAUDAN, TRUTH, ERROR, AND CRIMINAL LAW 40
(2006) (“[Beyond a reasonable doubt] was meant to codify the meaning of the presumption
of innocence of the accused.”).
172
Accord Mayson, supra note 107, at 537 (“The central problem with each of these
moral-predicate theories is that they justify pretrial deprivations of liberty by pointing to a
defendant’s responsibility for the charged offense. But to invoke a defendant’s guilt as
justification for pretrial restraint threatens fundamental due process values, which tend to run
under the head of the “presumption of innocence.”).
173
See Kai Draper, Necessity and Proportionality in Defense, in THE ETHICS OF SELF-
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the harm or wrong threatened by the “aggressor” dictates the amount of harm
that may be imposed on her.174 A defender may not kill an aggressor to
prevent a paper cut. The necessity requirement has a number of philosophical
nuances, but we can simplify the question here to whether or not one would
need to use the force to stop the harm.175 So, if an aggressor threatens deadly
force and the defender can successfully defend either by slapping the
aggressor or shooting the aggressor, shooting is unnecessary. Finally,
although the imminence requirement is invoked in cases of individual selfdefense, many theorists claim that imminence mediates the citizen/state
boundary such that the state ought to intervene before a threat is imminent.176
This understanding would yield that there is no imminence requirement for
pretrial detention because it is state action. An alternative understanding of
the imminence requirement as serving as an actus reus for aggression, would
ask what minimum act is required before the state takes may act
preemptively.177
Elsewhere, I have argued that some forms of preventive interference
(not necessarily pretrial detention) can be justified on similar grounds.178
Specifically, I have claimed that if someone has a current intention to commit

DEFENSE, supra note 166, at 171, 171 (“[T]he right to defend the innocent against unjust
aggression is limited to the infliction of necessary harm and is further limited to the infliction
of proportionate harm.”); Kimberly Kessler Ferzan, Defending Imminence: From Battered
Women to Iraq, 46 ARIZ. L. REV. 213, 223 (2004) (noting right to self-defense requires
imminent, unlawful force).
174
FROWE, supra note 165, at 118.
175
See Kimberly Kessler Ferzan, Stand Your Ground, in THE PALGRAVE HANDBOOK
OF APPLIED ETHICS AND THE CRIMINAL LAW 731, 734 (Larry Alexander & Kimberly
Kessler Ferzan eds., 2019) (noting different constructions of the necessity requirement).
For a masterful demonstration of the complexities of the necessity requirement, see Patrick
Tomlin, Distributive Justice for Aggressors, 39 LAW & PHIL. 351 (2020).
176
E.g., David Gauthier, Self-Defense and the Requirement of Imminence: Comments
on George Fletcher's Domination in the Theory of Justification and Excuse, 57 U. PITT. L.
REV. 615, 616-17 (1996) (“If the absence of imminent attack leaves the individual space to
appeal to the protection the law claims to offer, then the individual must make that appeal;
she may not choose instead to rely on her own force and effort.”); George P. Fletcher,
Domination in the Theory of Justification and Excuse, 57 U. PITT. L. REV. 553, 570 (1996)
(“Similarly, when an attack against private individuals is imminent, the police are no longer
in a position to intervene and exercise the state's function of securing public safety.”).
177
Ferzan, supra note 173, at 217 (“Imminence serves as the actus reus for aggression,
separating those threats that we may properly defend against from mere inchoate and
potential threats.”).
178
Kimberly Kessler Ferzan, Beyond Crime and Commitment: Justifying Liberty
Deprivations of the Dangerous and Responsible, 96 MINN. L. REV. 141, 163 (2011) (“[T]he
same normative considerations that justify self-defense will justify other forms of preventive
intervention”).
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an offense (manifested by an overt act179), and the state is convinced of this
beyond a reasonable doubt (or at least by clear and convincing evidence),180
then the state should intervene with the least restrictive means possible. I
have also argued that when we are convinced that a criminal intention is
present, the state need not wait until the threat is imminent.181
My aim is not to defend my earlier work here. Rather, it is merely to
demonstrate that a defense-based theory can ground prevention by the state.
Pretrial detention is justified if there is a forfeiture condition that goes beyond
statistical probability—the formation of an intention (and act in support of
it), and there is an epistemic requirement (of at least clear and convincing
evidence if not proof beyond a reasonable doubt). The bottom line is that
even if one rejects my theory of how self-defense works, a theory of selfdefense will justify some interventions by the state against dangerous
individuals.
Notably, bail hearings on dangerousness are wildly overinclusive,
extending their reach beyond those cases grounded in self-defense. Current
statistical measures do not demonstrate that individuals will commit a crime
in the future. They do not even purport to guestimate whether the defendant
currently has a criminal intention. Nevertheless, when these conditions are
met, preventive detention is justified. That is, if someone has a current plan
to commit a serious criminal offense, the state is justified in stopping her,
even if it means detaining her.
In practice, this would mean that the state is permitted to detain
someone like Earl Shriner. Shriner was released from prison in May 1987,
after completing a ten-year sentence for kidnaping and assaulting two teenage
girls.182 During his last months in prison he wrote in his diary detailed plans
to maim and kill children upon release, and he told his cellmate that he wanted
a van customized with cages so he could pick up children, molest them, and
kill them.183 And when Shriner got out, he abducted a child, sexually
assaulted him, and killed him.184 Certainly, at the pretrial stage, someone
who is voicing such plans may be detained.

179

Id. at 168. The overt act requirement is in place to limit government overreaching,
but is not required on a purely philosophical level. Id.
180
Kimberly Kessler Ferzan, Preventive Justice and the Presumption of Innocence, 8
CRIM. L. & PHIL. 505, 523 (2014) (tentatively endorsing beyond a reasonable doubt as the
standard, but expressing sympathy for clear and convincing evidence).
181
Ferzan, supra note 178, at 174-76 (discussing and rejecting an imminence
requirement before the state intervenes preventively against a culpable aggressor).
182
ROXANNE LIEB, WASH. INST. FOR PUB. POL’Y, WASHINGTON’S SEXUALLY VIOLENT
PREDATOR LAW: LEGISLATIVE HISTORY AND COMPARISONS WITH OTHER STATES 1 (1996).
183
Id. at 1 n.1.
184
Id. at 1.
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Ultimately, my goal is not to defend a precise test for when the state
may be permitted to detain someone based on these dangerousness grounds.
Instead, my goal is simply to articulate one way to think about dangerousness.
When a defendant intends a serious criminal offense, he forfeits the right
against force, and detention to prevent that offense may be necessary,
proportionate, and justified in defense of others.

2.

Overriding/Violating Rights and Dangerousness Detention

Let’s assume that we cannot punish prior to trial (desert-based
dangerousness detention) and that the defendant does not harbor the kind of
intention required for forfeiture (defense-based dangerousness detention).
Are we stuck? Can’t we just detain someone if we think there is a good
chance that she will commit a serious crime later? Let’s consider pure
prevention dangerousness detention.
To assess this ground for detention, let’s move from a clear case of
self-defense to an ambiguous one. Assume that Alice is unsure whether Betty
is attacking her. We might think that for Alice to give due respect to both her
life and Betty’s, she must think it more likely than not that Betty is an actual
attacker before she kills Betty in self-defense.185 It would give Betty too little
respect if Alice killed her on a hunch, but it would give Betty too much
respect if Alice has to absorb a substantial risk of injury before taking action.
They are both equals.
Consider now a further complication. What if Betty is (perhaps)
threatening both Alice and Albert? Or Alice, Albert, Anja, and Antonio?
Does the degree of confidence that Alice must have before killing Betty
decrease as more lives are at stake? The answer should be “no.” The reason
is that we owe Betty a certain degree of respect before we decide that she has
forfeited her rights. That degree of respect does not alter with the stakes.186
This claim is deontological.
But, you may think, surely Alice may kill Betty if there are a thousand
lives at stake. Notice, though, that on this logic Alice may be permitted to
kill Bob, a completely innocent person, if there are a thousand lives at stake.
That is, the initial rationale for defending against Betty was that she had
The law often reduces the inquiry to whether Alice “reasonably believes” that Betty
is threatening her. Elsewhere, however, I have argued that a standard, such as preponderance
of the evidence, is preferable to asking whether a defender believes the aggressor is attacking
her. See generally Kimberly Kessler Ferzan, Deontological Distinction in War, 129 ETHICS
603 (2019).
186
Id. at 617 (arguing “the level of confidence does not decrease when more lives are at
stake because of a concern with aggregation[, and therefore, no] person’s liability threshold
should be affected by how many people will be on the other side”).
185
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forfeited a right, whereas the rationale for harming Bob is that his rights are
overridden by public need.187
To be clear about the scope of this sort of “overriding” argument,
assume there is a 10% chance that you have a deadly disease that will kill a
million people. Would the state be justified in putting you in quarantine for
two months to prevent the spread of the disease? Here, we might think the
answer is yes. Although we do not have significant evidence, the threat is so
large that we are entitled to override your rights to save so many others. In
such a case, however, you would be entitled to a comfy bed and some
compensation. After all, we are harming you for us.188
Dangerousness detention can be framed similarly. The defendant’s
rights are being outweighed by the greater good. It is not about what the
defendant has done but about a risk-based prediction of what the defendant
will do. We override rights when we quarantine, when we tie yachts to docks
during storms, and so forth.
Despite its superficial appeal, dangerousness-based detention
premised on this sort of argument violates our rights and is normatively
objectionable. It is disrespectful of the agent. It does not deny that the agent
has autonomy or the ability to choose rightly, but it does suggest that we do
not trust the agent to choose rightly. A stance that detains someone because
we do not want to run the risk of their wrongdoing is a stance of the state as
distrusting its citizenry.189 This is distinct from merely overriding a right.
We are not simply turning a trolley from five people to one person; this is
turning the trolley to the one because we believe the person may act
impermissibly. The harm is eliminative. We aim to harm the agent to
eliminate the threat, not as a side effect of helping others.190 Although the
state may have reasons to detain nonresponsible agents on the basis of their
dangerousness, there are strong reasons to object to the state locking us up
Cf. ADIL AHMAD HAQUE, LAW AND MORALITY AT WAR 122 (2017) (“In principle, it
may be epistemically permissible to kill a person whom you reasonably believe is innocent
if the expected value of doing so is vastly greater than the expected disvalue.”).
188
See generally Bruce Ackerman, The Emergency Constitution, 113 YALE L.J. 1029,
1062-66 (2004) (calling for compensation of detained innocents); Michael Corrado,
Punishment, Quarantine, and Preventive Detention, 15 CRIM. JUST. ETHICS 3, 11 (1996)
(arguing the State should compensate the preventively detained for their loss of liberty); Paul
H. Robinson, Punishing Dangerousness: Cloaking Preventive Detention as Criminal Justice,
114 HARV. L. REV. 1429, 1446 (2001) (“[I]f a person is detained for society’s benefit rather
than as deserved punishment, the conditions of detention should not be punitive.”); see also
infra Part IV.B.2.
189
Duff, supra note 170, at 120 (arguing that state owes us respect and trust).
190
ALEC D. WALEN, THE MECHANICS OF CLAIMS AND PERMISSIBLE KILLING IN WAR
41-42 (2019) (noting that the justificatory structure of an eliminative killing runs through
eliminating the threat he poses and is distinct from the justificatory structure for harming
someone as a side-effect).
187
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because it fears us.
Although I take this objection to be decisive and therefore pure
preventive dangerousness detention to be unjust, there is no point in
belaboring the point given how rampant the practice is. Instead, it is essential
to note that even its proponents must recognize that this theory, construed in
its best light, is an instance of overriding a right. That is, the best case for
this sort of treatment is that it is like Vincent v. Lake Erie. And that requires
compensation and satisfactory conditions.191
3. Disentangling Dangerousness
As you can now see, the rhetoric of dangerousness can mask three
distinct rationales for detention. First, like incapacitation after a criminal
conviction, we might detain the dangerous because their culpable past crime
forfeits the right to liberty. Second, like self-defense, we might detain the
dangerous because their culpable intent to commit future crime forfeits the
right to liberty. Third, like quarantine, we might confine the dangerous
because the public good outweighs their right to liberty. Notably, and
importantly, two of these rationales—defense-based detention and pure
prevention—apply to everyone. That is, there is nothing special about the
crime charged except that the state actually has its hands on the detainee. But
if the state is justified in detaining on the basis of a future threat alone, the
pendency of the criminal case is doing no justifying work. The commission
of the charged offense is at best evidentiary of future conduct.192
To identify these three rationales is not to endorse them all. Two are
deeply problematic: We should not pre-punish individuals while they await
trial. And we should not lock someone up because we do not trust them to
choose rightly. In addition, whatever the rationale for detention is, there is a
further question as to where the burden of proof should be set. How confident
must we be that the relevant facts obtain such that we may detain someone
Cf. Duff, supra note 170, at 132 (“A recognition of that cost should have implications
for how such defendants are treated: for the conditions under which they are detained, and
the efforts that must be made to allow them to maintain as much connection with their
ordinary lives as possible’ for the compensation that may be due to them.”).
192
One interesting question is whether the defendant’s desert impacts the degree of
confidence that the state must have. That is, rather than justifying that the defendant forfeits
his right against punishment (desert-based dangerousness detention), the thought is that the
defendant forfeits a high burden of proof before being detained because of potential
dangerousness. However, the same procedural morality questions arise if we use guilt as a
forfeiture condition. Indeed, Alec Walen, who proposes this “lost status” view, deploys it as
a form of punishment once guilt has been determined beyond a reasonable doubt. See Alec
Walen, A Punitive Precondition for Preventive Detention: Lost Status as an Element of Just
Punishment, 63 SAN DIEGO L. REV. 1229 (2011).
191
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on these distinct dangerousness grounds? Each rationale requires its own
analysis and answer. For our purposes of merely identifying the potential
grounds of detention, I can leave this question unanswered,193 but it is of
tremendous importance if we wish to justify detention.
C. Flight
Let us now turn to flight.194 Underpinning this reason are similar
rights-forfeiture and rights-overriding justifications. Detaining based on
flight concerns may, in some circumstances, be justified because the
defendant has a current intention to flee the jurisdiction, thus violating her
duty to appear. And again, though it seems dubious, there is the potential to
make an argument that we may override someone’s right to liberty to secure
their appearance at trial.
Lauren Gouldin argues that we need to distinguish three different
ways that defendants can fail to appear.195 First, they can leave the
jurisdiction.196 Second, they can stay in the jurisdiction but try to avoid law
enforcement, what she calls “local absconders.”197 Third, they can fail to
appear through what might seem to be excusing or mitigating conditions,
ranging from forgetting the date of a court appearance, to logistical
challenges posed by work or childcare, to a general lack of capacity to
navigate the system.198 For our purposes, I suggest we collapse “true flight”
and local absconders, as the only difference between the two is that it is just
more costly to get someone across jurisdictional lines.199
Some cases of detention may be justified under a duty to appear
rationale. A defendant with a current intention to abscond does not intend to
do her duty to answer for the crime charged.200 This not only undermines the
instrumental, truth-seeking functions of a trial, but the criminal justice system
itself. For instance, Antony Duff, Lindsay Farmer, Sandra Marshall, and
Victor Tadros, have developed a theory of the criminal trial that takes the
193

But see note 180 (providing my defense of beyond a reasonable doubt).
There are empirical questions about how significant the failure to appear rate is.
Some numbers show open warrants at 7.8 million, but the number of serious felonies with
open warrants is likely closer to 100,000. Gouldin, supra note 126, at 689-690 (analyzing
data).
195
Id. at 683.
196
Id. at 725.
197
Id. at 735.
198
Id. at 729.
199
Id. at 725, 735.
200
Duff, supra note 170, at 127 (justifying detention against defendants who intend to
abscond because the state is thwarting the criminal attempt on which the defendant has
already embarked).
194
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trial’s adjudicative role to be valuable independent of the instrumental values
achieved through adjudication. Though they slightly back off this strong
normative claim in the context of criminal adjudication, they most forcefully
state their case in the interpersonal context:
[I]n ordinary social circumstances, where one individual legitimately
calls another to answer a charge concerning their behaviour, and to
account for their conduct if they are responsible for it, we
appropriately characterize the call as a demand. I think that you have
been spreading gossip about me at work. I call you to answer. I
outline the reasons that I think this, and if they are good reasons it
seems that there is a legitimate demand that you answer. Answering,
in these circumstances, is a moral obligation, and participation in the
conversation is a moral requirement. This seems right even if you are
in fact innocent of spreading gossip about me. In that case, you have
an obligation to dispel my fears.201
However, detention is only proportionate to those who have chosen
to flout their duty to be called to account for severe crimes.202 Even if the
defendant will commit a wrong in failing to appear, putting that person in a
cage to guarantee their appearance at trial is disproportionate to the duty they
threaten to ignore. It is true that all failures to appear threaten the state’s
authority to run its criminal justice system, but not all “callings to account”
are alike. Your friend might lose your pen, stand you up for dinner, or sleep
with your spouse. If you are then going to meet to discuss her wrongdoing,
it would be far more significant for her to fail to appear to discuss the adultery
than to discuss the pen loss. It is not just the value of being in a criminal trial
but being in a criminal trial for a particular crime that matters. It is important
to show up for your murder trial even if you are not guilty and will be
acquitted.203 For this reason, an intent to abscond from a serious offense may
justify liberty deprivation when the intent to abscond when charged with a

201

ANTONY DUFF, LINDSAY FARMER, SANDRA MARSHALL & VICTOR TADROS, 3 THE
TRIAL ON TRIAL: TOWARDS A NORMATIVE THEORY OF THE CRIMINAL LAW 209 (2007).
202
We might doubt whether the duty can even bear this weight. After all, the duty
applies to the innocent as well as the guilty. But if an innocent actor indicates that she plans
to flee to a non-extradition country and avoid her serial murder trial, is the mere fact that she
has a duty to answer for the crimes (that she did not commit) sufficiently weighty to justify
detention? This sort of proportionality question crucially depends upon the quality and
duration of the pretrial detention.
203
Cf. DUFF, FARMER, MARSHALL, AND TADROS, supra note 201, at 7 (rejecting the
“standard view” that the only value of the trial is instrumental in advising the state whom it
may punish).

Electronic copy available at: https://ssrn.com/abstract=4041973

The Trouble with Time Served

37

minor offense would not.204
Can the truth-seeking function of the criminal trial justify overriding
the rights of someone who does not have a current plan to flee? Such a
question applies both to the person whom we suspect may form the intent to
abscond in the future, but does not have one now, as well as the defendants
who fall into Gouldin’s third category and fail to appear for reasons such as
simply forgetting their court dates.
We should be highly skeptical that even trials for serious crimes can
justify putting someone behind bars because of what we think she may choose
to do in the future. This raises the same question of disrespect as pure
preventive dangerous detention, but with a significantly reduced state
interest. As for nonculpable nonappearances, if we lock up someone because
we think she will forget, we are not treating her as a responsible agent.
Moreover, the reasons she will simply fail to appear do not warrant our
distrust, as much as our empathy and accommodation. At bottom, we have
no more right to detain the criminal defendant based on a prediction than we
do a material witness, and to detain them there must be probable cause to
believe the witness won’t appear and there will be a failure of justice.205

D. Intimidation and Obstruction
Intimidation and obstruction, obstruction rationales, are simply
instantiations of our earlier reasons. Instead of being worried that the
defendant is simply dangerous, we believe he poses a specific danger to
someone (akin to dangerousness rationales) or we believe he poses a danger
to the trial process (akin to flight rationales). These interferences could take
the form of destroying evidence, intimidating witnesses, or even killing
witnesses.
Just as the duty to appear has two components that determine its
severity—both the failure to answer for one’s crime and the seriousness of
the underlying charge—obstruction has both features as well. The easiest
detentions to justify are those where the defendant has directly threatened to
204

Perhaps this is part of why, even in our earliest bail jurisprudence, some serious
crimes were not bailable. Carbone, supra note 34, at 522 (noting that the offense of homicide
became nonbailable in the twelfth century).
Interestingly, though our armchair speculation would be that crime seriousness also
serves the epistemic function of likelihood of flight, the empirics do not bear this out.
“[D]ecades of studies” challenge the claim that crime seriousness correlates with likelihood
of flight.” Gouldin, supra note 126, at 705 (noting “[t]hese studies conclude that other
factors, such as employment, family ties, community reputation, and prior record of
appearances, are better predictors of nonappearance”).
205
Bacon v. United States, 449 F.2d 933, 942 (9th Cir. 1971).
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seriously injure or kill a witness. These cases are akin to defense-based
dangerousness except that the crime is not just a general offense but one
directed at the particular criminal proceeding.
Detention to prevent serious, obstructive acts is likely to be justified,
irrespective of the crime charged. If you plan to kill the security guard to
prevent a shoplifting conviction, you still have no claim against being
detained to prevent you from killing the guard. (Indeed, perhaps the fact that
you have so little at stake makes the planned crime worse.) The pending
offense does little work here. The state has grounds to stop anyone who plans
to kill someone else, irrespective of their commission of an offense.
Conversely, even if the obstructive act is not particularly serious on
its own, it could have the potential to thwart a serious case. Absconding does
not hurt anyone else; it just thwarts the case. So, too, the intention to destroy
documents that would thwart a murder trial could also justify detention.
In contrast, low level obstruction of a low-level offense is far less
likely to justify detention. Consider the Yates case, where the fisherman
threw fish overboard to get rid of the evidence that his fish were unlawfully
small.206 Even if detention would somehow prevent the defendant from
throwing the fish overboard, the wrong of obstructing and the wrong of illegal
fishing still do not appear in the aggregate to justify a serious liberty
deprivation of the defendant.
Ultimately, this rationale faces the same two questions. Has the
defendant already formed the intention to obstruct in such a significant way
such that she is liable to be stopped by being detained? If not, do the ends
sought substantially outweigh the defendant’s liberty interests?
E. Failure to Make Bail
Many pretrial detainees are not in jail because the court has found that
there is no condition of release to secure their appearance.207 Instead, the
court has imposed a secured financial condition of release and the defendant
cannot pay it. Morally, detaining her requires a two-step justification: It
requires us to explain why bail may be imposed, and it requires us to explain
why she may be detained if she cannot pay her bail.
Can the imposition of bail be justified? As construed by the Court
and in its best normative light, bail is a guarantee that gives further weight to
a promise to appear.208 Antony Duff reasons that we all owe each other a

206

574 U.S. 528 (2015). We can disregard the fact that the Supreme Court ultimately
held that fish aren’t tangible objects under Sarbanes-Oxley for our purposes.
207
See supra notes 74-75.
208
See supra text accompanying note 34.
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degree of civic trust.209 Defendants who have given us reason to doubt that
we can trust them have additional duties to reassure us that they are
trustworthy.210 This might involve posting cash bail, relinquishing a
passport, or submitting to other minor restrictions on their liberty pending
trial.211
Notice that the normative argument for why we can ask for bail does
not provide the normative justification for what we may do if the defendant
cannot afford to pay bail. One thing to note is that if the defendant cannot
afford to pay, the bail request is probably unjust and any resulting detention
unjustified. Our criminal justice system should only impose fair conditions,
not ones the defendant cannot meet. If we truly distrust defendants, then we
ought to meet the test for detaining them outright rather than setting
conditions that de facto detain them.212
However, even if the request is a fair one, if the defendant cannot then
meet the condition, we need a justification for imposing the further hardship
of detention. Let’s say your friend owes you $10, but she only has a $50 bill
on her. It does not follow from the fact that she owes you $10 that you get
the fifty. So, too, even if we are allowed to ask for some reassurance, that
does not mean that if that reassurance cannot be provided, the result ought to
be detention. This same issue appears if the imposition of bail is in response
to a forfeiture rationale. For instance, imagine the defendant currently has an
Duff, supra note 170, at 123. As he goes on to argue, “we do owe it to each other to
recognize each other as fellows: not to assume in advance that others are enemies who might
attack us, and against whom we need to guard ourselves.” Id.
210
Id. at 126 (arguing it is fair to require reassurance “[g]iven the pressures created by
facing trial, given the temptations that they can generate to abscond or to obstruct justice,
given our awareness of our common human fallibility, we can see the context of a defendant
awaiting trial as one such context”); cf. Mayson, supra note 107, at 540 (noting that there
may be reasons to treat those for whom we have probable cause to believe they committed
an offense somewhat differently than an equally dangerous non-defendant).
211
John Duffy and Rich Hynes argue that originally bail required someone else, a surety,
to guarantee presence. Duffy and Hynes, supra note 20, at 1291-02. It was the surety that
stood to lose financially if the defendant failed to appear. Id. As noted above, the earliest
origins of bail required the surety to post the exact amount of the punishment. See supra text
accompanying note 34. As our country evolved, so, too, did bail. WAYNE H. THOMAS, JR.
BAIL REFORM IN AMERICA 11-12 (1976) (noting the American frontier made it difficult to
have close friends to serve as sureties while simultaneously offering easy escape for those
who wished to abscond). But the ultimate question is normative. What do we want bail to
do? What would justify taking money from anyone? Although there is not space to defend
this claim fully here, I think we should be highly suspicious that we should be vesting
authority in third parties to ensure the defendant’s appearance at trial. Instead, Duff’s view
that bail is about giving heft to a promise, given reasons for distrust, seems far more in
keeping with how we ought to treat each other and what we may fairly ask of each other.
212
See Mayson, supra note 60, at 1679 (arguing “an order imposing unaffordable bail
is an order of pretrial detention and must be treated as such”).
209
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intention to flee rather than be tried for a nonviolent crime, and the court
requires a $300,000 secured bond in response. What justifies the detention if
the bail isn’t paid? If I am attacking you and plan to punch your arm, such
that I am liable to a proportionate response, you would not be justified in
throwing me over a bridge, as that would be disproportionate to the degree of
my forfeiture.
Here again, the only justification for so doing is that the defendant’s
right is being overridden. It is an overriding justification that makes up the
difference between what the defendant owes or has forfeited and the greater
hardship we impose on her.213 Recall the reasoning of the Klimas court:
“Whether bail, once set, can be posted is dependent on the defendant's
financial ability, but this implicit discrimination between the rich and the poor
is tolerable in light of the state's overriding need to produce all defendants,
rich or poor, at trial.”214 The person who cannot afford bail has not forfeited
rights up to the level of detention. Instead, we are taking her and overriding
her rights for the greater good. In these sorts of cases, the defendant is entitled
to adequate conditions of confinement and compensation for all that she loses
as a result of serving the government’s ends. Again, an overriding rationale
places these detentions in their best normative light. However, it is more
likely that these detentions are simply unjust, as they ask the defendant to
make a promise he is simply incapable of making.
****
Inability to make bail. Dangerousness. Obstruction. Flight. These
are the legal categories that purport to justify detention. Underpinning these
rationales, however, are three different rights relationships. First, sometimes
defendants simply have their rights violated. The state uses an overbroad test
and imposes a harm that is unjustified. Second, sometimes defendants have
forfeited their liberty interests against the detention—because they deserve
it, because they intend a future criminal act, or because they plan to flout their
duty to answer in a serious case. Third, sometimes, defendant’s rights are
being overridden. Though I have suggested reasons to be deeply skeptical of
this final rationale, it is the one employed by the Court, allowing a
defendant’s liberty interest to be subordinated to the “greater needs of
society.”215

213

Saba Bazargan, Killing Minimally Responsible Threats, 125 ETHICS 114, 129 (2014)
(proposing a hybrid justification in self-defense cases that combines forfeiture and lesserevils justifications).
214
Klimas v. State, 249 N.W.2d 285, 287-88 (Wis. 1977).
215
United States v. Salerno, 481 U.S. 739, 741, 748-51 (1987).
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WHY GIVE CREDIT FOR TIME SERVED?

As discussed in Part I, every jurisdiction gives credit for time
served.
And, the purported rationales for so enacting were the view that
detention is punishment, that time served saves money, or that time served
ensures that the poor are treated equally to the rich.217 But little thought has
been given to drawing direct and explicit connections between the reasons
why we detain and the moral justifications for giving credit.218
Let us take a step back, then, and ask from the theoretical perspective:
Does credit for time served match the reasons that we detain people? That
is, how do we make sense of this practice that by almost retroactive magic
takes something that the Supreme Court has decisively stated is not
punishment and turn it into punishment? Now that we see that some
detentions are unjust, some are a response to rights forfeiture, and some
require us to override the defendant’s liberty interest for the greater good, we
can ask whether time served is an appropriate response to these detention
rationales.
216

A. Unjust Detentions
Our current practices detain people whom we ought not to detain. If
a defendant is indigent and entitled to bail, she should not be held. Intuitively,
it seems that the least we can do is give her credit for time served. One way
to think about credit for time served is that it compensates the unjustly
detained, and the other way is to think that this time in detention justifiably
counts toward the punishment. This section examines both approaches.
Ultimately, there is theoretical support for using credit for time served in
either way. However, both approaches are underinclusive in failing to
account for those who are not found guilty, and both approaches have farreaching implications for the criminal justice system generally, thus
rendering credit for time served meager and ad hoc.
1. Compensation
Adam Kolber rejects that a compensation account is itself sufficient
to justify credit for time-served.219 First, he questions the commensurability
of detention (which is not supposed to be punishment) and punishment.220
216

See supra note 11.
See supra text accompanying notes 151-59.
218
The two exceptions, Kolber and Donelson, are discussed infra Part III.A.
219
Kolber, supra note 13, at 1151-53.
220
Id. at 1151
217
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Second, he suggests that we could financially compensate detainees.221
Third, he notes that this credit does not look like compensation because it is
not transferrable; for instance, it cannot be used as credit against future
crimes.222
The heart of the objection is commensurability. At first, this seems
to be decisive. Imagine that a state employee hit you with her vehicle while
pursuing her official duties. It would seem decidedly odd to argue that you
ought to be able to use the compensation owed against the sentence in your
forthcoming criminal case.
But let me suggest that this might be slightly more plausible than we
take it to be. First, one point about commensurability is that you shouldn’t
cash out cash against incarceration. Pay them, says Kolber. But payment is
already presupposing the commensurability of the wrong done (detention)
and the compensation (cash). Simultaneously, we take punishment to come
in different modes from incarceration to fines to home detention. If we can
debate whether to punish something with a fine or with home detention, we
are already assuming some metric for comparison.
Kolber, who is looking for an explanation sufficient for all creditings
of time served, also raises the problem of transferability. This is a problem
with current practice. Jurisdictions that give credit for time served require
that the detention be related to the crime for which they are being
sentenced.223 But if the point is that the state has detained the defendant
unjustly, and is giving a coupon to be spent on time incarcerated, why does
the state get to limit the coupon’s effect to “this visit only?”
Perhaps the idea is that although as a theoretical matter, the state owes
the defendant credit, it does not want to authorize the defendant to commit
additional wrongs. It seems like a “get out of jail free” card. Accordingly,
this credit is limited so that the state is not seen as authorizing additional
wrongdoing. Still, this does not explain why the defendant could not be given
credit for other pending charges, even ones for which she was not being
detained. Given that there really is no legitimate basis for the detention, why
shouldn’t this debt be recognized for any offense?

221

Id. at 1152.
Id.
223
Commonwealth v. Milton, 690 N.E.2d 1232, 1237 (Mass. 1998) (refusing to give
credit to a later charge for 410 days spent in jail because “[t]o allow prisoners to ‘bank
time’ in such a manner would be a matter of great concern, because it could in effect grant
prisoners a license to commit future criminal acts with immunity”); see also
Commonwealth v. Carter, 93 Va. Cir. 129 (Cir. Ct. 2016) ("The statute only requires jail
credit on the offense for which the defendant is 'awaiting trial.’”); WIS. STAT. §
973.155(1)(a) (2019–20) (Requiring custody be “in connection with the course of conduct
for which sentence was imposed”).
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Compensation, then, could be a justification for our practice.
However, this remedy is wildly underinclusive as it is only available to those
who are actually convicted and only applies to the crime for which they were
charged. Moreover, although courts maintain that it is unconstitutional to
subject the poor to more detention than the rich, the fact that we distinguish
between the innocent rich and the innocent poor remains.224 If guilty,
indigent defendants are entitled to compensation, then innocent, indigent
defendants are as well. Crediting for time served might be compensatory for
some, but it leaves the innocent empty handed.
2. Punishment
Is pretrial detention really just punishment or the hard treatment
inherent in punishment? Whereas Raff Donelson takes the first approach,225
Kolber argues that proportionality is about harsh treatment, which the
detained person experienced.226 This section reveals that there are plausible
theoretical accounts that would allow us to think of unjust detentions as
legitimately taken into account for determining the total amount of
punishment. Notably, any path we take would require radical revision of our
practices if it were thoroughly and consistently adopted.
Consider the punishment claim first. Recently, Donelson has
defended the idea of “natural punishment.”227 Donelson uses an example
where a robber accidentally shoots himself while running away, and a mother
who negligently kills her baby by wedging the car seat in an overcrowded
car.228 “Roughly, the idea is that, in such cases, the world punishes the
wrongdoer.”229 More specifically, Donelson confines natural punishment to
three elements: “(1) adversity, (2) caused by wrongdoing, and (3) not caused
by anyone’s intention to extract retribution on the wrongdoer.”230 Donelson’s
proposal is to treat some natural punishment as what he calls “constitutional
punishment,” which is natural punishment for legal wrongs that have been
discovered by the state.231
Donelson’s argument for calling pretrial detention punishment, in the
face of Supreme Court jurisprudence decreeing that detention is not
224

Accord Kolber, supra note 13, at 1153.
See infra text accompanying notes 227-33.
226
Kolber, supra note 13, at 1155 (“Though detention is not punishment, it is still harsh
treatment and should therefore make an offender less deserving of additional harsh
treatment.”).
227
Donelson, supra note 13.
228
Id. at 3.
229
Id. at 3.
230
Id. at 7.
231
Id. at 18.
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punishment, is:
[T]he American legal system sometimes allow these time
transformations. In such time transformations, before a certain point
in time, a particular harm is not legal punishment, but after that point
in time, that very same harm, that already happened is legal
punishment.
I suggest we think about natural punishment
232
similarly.
As to whether pretrial detention qualifies as natural punishment,
Donelson is unequivocal: “Natural punishment is not merely similar to that
other pre-trial practice; pre-trial detention before a rightful conviction just is
natural punishment.”233
Kolber, however, previously argued against this kind of retroactive
characterization.234 The problem, Kolber claims, is consistency. Applying
Kolber’s concern to Donelson’s argument yields this question: If we
erroneously convict someone and find out a decade later, what is to prevent
us from time transforming this into non-punishment?235
Nevertheless, Donelson’s proposal opens up two inquiries. First, is
there a justification for “time transformation?” Second, is there a reason to
credit the detention as punishment?
Let me suggest that the answer to the first question is no, but the
second may be yes. The bottom line is that Donelson thinks these detentions
should count, and we do later call them punishment, so it appears that we
have retroactively decreed them punishment. Welcome to the actual practice
of the criminal law, which is often confused and unprincipled. But this does
not mean that scholars should take these things on board, bless them, and give
them labels. There is no reason to think that at t2 something becomes
punishment when at t1 it was not. And, for the cases under consideration—
defendants who were held unjustly because they should not have been
detained—it is hard to say that we are ultimately going to count this as justly
punishing them.
Still, we might think that t1 hardships should count against later
punishment. That is, there may be good reason to count pretrial detention.
Let me suggest four potential arguments that support the proposition that t1
hardships matter. Bottom line—yes, pretrial detention may be the sort of
hardship that should “count” for punishment purposes. But it is hardly the
only sort of hardship, and our practices thus select out some people for credit,
232

Id. at 26.
Id.
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Kolber, supra note 13, at 1150-51.
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Id. at 1151.
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but exclude others.
First, there is the argument that some prior acts are punishment at the
time they are inflicted. Donelson is not interested in these cases, as he
specifically exempts cases where individuals aim to exact retribution, but
Doug Husak has presented a compelling argument that sometimes individuals
may “already be punished enough.”236 Husak argues that stigma and hard
treatment are components of punishment, and that it is not truly the state, but
society, that imposes stigma.237 Accordingly, if someone has already been
subjected to substantial social stigma, Husak believes that this should result
in less punishment by the state. If we are allowing stigmatic harms to count
towards punishment, then, our sentencing practices should consider them far
more widely.
Second, we might think that hard treatment, without stigma,
particularly when imposed by the state, should count toward what is
proportionate. Kolber explicitly pursues this line of inquiry: “Though
detention is not punishment, it is still harsh treatment and should therefore
make an offender less deserving of harsh treatment.”238 Kolber notes there
are “tricky details” about what counts, including whether it can be from other
people or nature and the timing, but that “pretrial detention is surely an easy
case.”239 From here, he states that, “We can also understand certain debates
about credit for time served as reasonable efforts to untangle the nature of the
harsh treatment that should count for purposes of proportionality.”240
Notably, if “harsh treatment” counts as part of punishment, the buck does not
stop with pretrial incarceration; all kinds of collateral consequences might
likewise count.241
Third, we could simply embrace a “whole life” view of desert.242 This
would mean that earlier undeserved harms—perhaps stemming from poverty,
racism, or other systemic injustices—count against deserved harms later.
This would be far for expansive, as it would include harms that did not result
from state action. It would embrace a view that justice is about evening up
236

Douglas N. Husak, Already Punished Enough, PHIL. TOPICS, Spring 1990, at 79.
Id. at 88 (“If stigma itself is not created by the state in the way the state imposes hard
treatment and deprivation, but depends upon social convention, it becomes important to
identify the social conventions from which stigma derives.”).
238
Kolber, supra note 13, at 1153.
239
Id. at 1156.
240
Id. at 1157.
241
Id. at 1158 (“Shifting from proportional punishment to proportional harsh treatment,
however, only solves the myself of credit for time served by generating even deeper problems
that strike at the very heart of retributivist proportionality in familiar forms.”).
242
W.D. ROSS, THE RIGHT AND THE GOOD 59 (1930) (arguing we should take into
account the defendant’s life “taken as a whole”); Gertrude Ezorsky, The Ethics of
Punishment, in PHILOSOPHICAL PERSPECTIVES ON PUNISHMENT xi, xxii-xxvii (Gertrude
Ezorsky, ed., 2d ed. 2015) (setting forth the whole life view).
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the scales at the end, as opposed to doing time slice justice.243 Admittedly,
most scholars (and all practitioners) would balk at this kind of view, as
theoretically it seems to embrace “get out of jail free” cards and practically it
simply is not administrable for courts.244 Nevertheless, this sort of view
would support the notion that undeserved confinement can count against later
punishment. However, again, accepting a view like this would mean that
credit for time served would just be the tip of the iceberg.
Finally, one might not need to endorse any of these views about how
to characterize the earlier detention to get to the view that this should be set
off against later punishment. Instead of thinking that the earlier detention is
directly set off against punishment, as if they are on the same metric, one
might think instead that the earlier detention gives a reason not to give the
person what she otherwise deserves. Consider the mother who causes the
death of her child. One way to think about this case is that the earlier
suffering counts against the total that she deserves. 245 The other way to think
about this is that although at the time of sentencing, the mother still deserves
the full quantum of punishment, there is a reason not to give her what she
deserves because of the earlier undeserved suffering. This would then be akin
to the way that sentencing courts often take into account mitigating factors in
ways that are not easily reduced to sentencing guidelines. Under this theory,
many other hardships would warrant consideration, making this justification,
like the other ones, too strong in comparison to our actual punishment
practices. But perhaps it is also too weak; this depends upon how one
construes the reason not to give the person what she deserves.
In summary, what this section suggests is that there are theoretical
justifications for crediting time served against the punishment in instances in
which the defendant was unjustly detained in the first instance. All of these
theories reveal that our current treatment of unjustified harms is wildly
underinclusive, only taking into account some of the instances in which some
sort of compensation, credit, or mercy is deserved or warranted. In other
words, if we were to truly commit to endorse any of these theories, we would
have to radically revise our sentencing practices in myriad other respects.
243

Adam J. Kolber, The Time Frame Challenge to Retributivism, in OF ONE-EYED AND
TOOTHLESS MISCREANTS: MAKING THE PUNISHMENT FIT THE CRIME? 183, 183 (Michael
Tonry ed., 2020) (“The whole-life view examines all of offenders’ good and bad deeds and
all of the good and bad things that have happened to them in order to impose penal treatment
proportionate to moral desert.”).
244
Id. at 205 (“I suspect many readers would happily give up the whole-life view. It is
impractical and would not only fail to adequately deter crime but might encourage it with
get-out-of-jail-free cards. While a justification of punishment can idealize away from some
real-world complications, the whole-life view does so too much to be of practical use.”).
245
See SHELLY KAGAN, THE GEOMETRY OF DESERT 18 (2012) (“[T]o say that something
is better with regard to desert is not yet to say whether it is better overall . . . .”).
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After all, pretrial detainees are not the only individuals who are stigmatized,
are subjected to hard treatment, experience undeserved injuries, or provide
reasons against punishment. Taking any of these views seriously would
require a rigorous and calculated lowering of sentences, not just giving
detainees credit for time served.246 We should also not forget that defendants
whose charges are dropped or who are acquitted receive nothing under this
regime.

B. Desert-Based Dangerousness Detention
There is one rationale for detention that we can easily justify in giving
credit for time served. Recall that the grounding for desert-based
dangerousness detention is that the state is using the defendant’s commission
of the charged offense as a reason why he now lacks a claim against the state
stopping him from committing future offenses. Again, importantly, we ought
to be extremely skeptical that this kind of detention can be justified. It would
require us to essentially prejudge the defendant’s guilt for the criminal case
and use that determination as a reason to already be intervening against future
offenses. These cases are truly instances of substantively unjust detentions.
If that is true, then for the reasons given above, the defendant may be entitled
to credit for time served.
Likewise, if we determine that this category can be normatively
defended, the defendant would be entitled to credit for time served. Here, the
forfeiture that allows the punishment is being generated by the defendant’s
guilt for the charged offense. If the deserved punishment is indeed what
justifies the detention, then the defendant ought to receive credit for that
punishment after conviction. Of course, because innocent defendants are
held, giving credit for time served does nothing to account for their
incarceration. They are being pre-punished for a crime that we ultimately
determine that they did not commit.

C. Forfeiture: Flight, Obstruction, and Defense-Based Dangerousness
Detention
Sometimes the defendant is being detained in order to prevent her
from acting on a current intent to interfere with the adjudication process (by
absconding or interfering with witnesses or evidence) or to commit an
246

To be sure, defense attorneys make these arguments and judges take them into
account. Prosecutors even use these facts in determining what to charge. Nevertheless, these
discretionary practices are nothing like the systematic credit given for pretrial detention.
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unrelated crime. In these cases, we should rightly question whether she is
entitled to credit for time served. That is, if Alex attacks Betty and Betty
punches him in the face, would Alex be entitled to argue that the harm he has
already suffered (a black eye) should be set off against the punishment he
will receive? It depends. While some consequentialist justifications for
punishment might be happy to double dip on the earlier detention, other
consequentialist reasons, along with retributive arguments, should reject that
forfeiture-based pretrial detention can do double duty as punishment. Bottom
line: Not all pretrial detainees should receive credit for time served.
1. Justifications for Punishment
As we discuss the interaction of defense and punishment, it is crucial
to attend to the justifications for punishment more precisely. Here, I want to
clarify how to think about consequentialist justifications, and then how to
parse negative and positive retributivism.
The typically invoked consequentialist justifications for punishment
are general deterrence, specific deterrence, incapacitation, and
rehabilitation.247 The justification most likely to allow for credit for time
served is general deterrence. If we think that the way that general deterrence
functions is that the sentence imposed is what generates the deterrence—e.g.,
bank robbers get 10 years—then a general deterrence theorist would want a
total of ten years of pain imposed because of the bank robbery. Since the
general deterrence theorists just wants ten years, she should be happy to
include any time spent in pretrial detention toward that ten. The fact that
forfeiture/self-defense was the initial reason for imposing the harm will be of
little consequence to the deterrence theorist so long as the detention can be
claimed to be imposed by the state in a way that counts toward deterring the
general populace.
In contrast, rehabilitation, specific deterrence, and incapacitation are
not about general messaging. These forward-looking inquiries will take into
account the amount of time spent in detention, but not a granting of “credit.”
If the detention makes the defendant worse, then she arguably needs more
time in prison. If detention has scared her straight, then she needs less time.
But the detention is merely an input in the calculation, and once that
calculation is made, there is no reason to subtract out the detention from the
sentence. That is, once the defendant needs four more years for specific
deterrence, then the time she spent in detention before should not be credited
against the formal sentence by either the judge or the prison administrators.
Now, let us focus on two different concerns. First, retributivists, as
247

JOSHUA DRESSLER, UNDERSTANDING CRIMINAL LAW § 2.03[A][2] (8th ed. 2020).
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well as most theorists who subscribe to some sort of side-constraint or
limitation on punishment, will be concerned with proportionality.248 The
question for them is whether the total amount of punishment received exceeds
what is proportionate. Second, many retributivists take it to be intrinsically
good for people to get what they deserve.249 If defendants are not entitled to
get credit, and they do, then a positive retributivist would think that the
defendant is not getting her full just deserts. Clearly, punishing someone
more than she deserves is more problematic than punishing her less. But we
should ask whether a defendant is entitled to credit for the harm she suffers
in self-defense as part of her punishment. After all, we just gave four
retributivist accounts of why unjust detentions can count as part of the
punishment. In what follows, I will discuss the relationship between the
defensive-based rationales and retributive punishment because this presents
greater complexity than the consequentialist math above.
2. Retribution and the Relatedness Objection
The first objection to crediting the detention against the punishment
is that the two have nothing to do with each other. The punishment is for the
crime with which the defendant was charged. But the forfeiture-based
detention was justified based upon another potential wrong. If Alice is
convicted of bank robbery but was detained because she was going to kill
Mary, the witness, why should the harm that Alice suffers in preventing her
from killing Mary be credited against the bank robbery that Alice committed?
Because this detention appears within the context of the criminal case,
we are lulled in the false sense that these two acts by the state are related.
However, they are not. We are not asking whether Joe is simultaneously
punishing and preventing Bob if Joe punches Bob to stop Bob from stabbing
him. This would be more akin to asking whether such a punch would
simultaneously be preventing Bob from the stabbing and punishing Bob for
cheating on his tax returns last year.

3. Retribution and the Argument from Desert
Though the relatedness objection may seem decisive for some, more
248
For discussion of the various positions, see generally Mitchell N. Berman,
Proportionality, Constraint, and Culpability, 15 CRIM. L. & PHIL. 371 (2021).
249
Alec Walen, Retributive Justice § 3.2, in STANFORD ENCYCLOPEDIA OF PHILOSOPHY
(Edward N. Zalta ed., 2021), https://plato.stanford.edu/archives/sum2021/entries/justiceretributive (describing positive retributivism as including the view that it is intrinsically good
for people to get what they deserve).
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argument may be necessary. Recall that when we were giving credit for
unjust detentions, we were potentially willing to count a necessarily unrelated
hardship against the punishment.250 Indeed, a whole life view of desert would
seemingly count any undeserved hardship in the calculus.
The claim here—a bad thing happened to me and it should count
against my punishment—at first seems quite appealing. Indeed, our
intuitions about “already punished enough” are what led us to think that
crediting unjust detentions was unproblematic. But the distinguishing feature
here is that the harm is not unjustified. The defendant’s culpable plan to harm
someone else led to his liberty restriction. These cases are more akin to the
defendant who says, “look how hard my life has been: my wife left me when
I cheated on her, I lost my job when I opted to play video games instead of
operating on my patient, I went to prison for arson, and so forth.” The
question is why these earlier justified hardships would count against
punishment on a whole life view. Ultimately, this turns on what we take
retributive desert to require. If we take a simplistic view that it only requires
suffering or hard treatment, then the defendant has suffered or been treated
harshly. But if we believe that what desert requires is suffering or hard
treatment that brings him below the moralized baseline of where he is entitled
to be, then some prior suffering—that which was imposed justifiably—does
not count against what the defendant can deserve now on a whole life view.251
Again, the claim under examination here is akin to the argument that if Alex
is harmed in self-defense when he attacks Betty, he ought to receive credit
for his scratched face, not even in a conviction for assaulting Betty, but in a
later carjacking conviction.
Here’s where we are. The defendant has been detained pretrial on
forfeiture grounds. She now claims that it would be appropriate to give her
credit for her detention, just as we are willing to give credit to the unjustly
detained. We have seen that consequentialists may come out differently, but
that retributivists should reject giving credit to this group because of 1) the
relatedness objection and 2) the fact that receiving one’s just deserts does not
include harms that are already justified on other grounds. This means that
the pretrial detainee cannot argue that the hardship she suffers can do double
duty: it cannot be forfeiture-based justified prevention and retributively
justified punishment.

250

See supra text accompanying notes 242–44.
Admittedly, this places a lot of weight on the determination of when a prior act is
justified and when it counts in the balance. For exploration, see LARRY ALEXANDER &
KIMBERLY KESSLER FERZAN, REFLECTIONS ON CRIME AND CULPABILITY: PROBLEMS AND
PUZZLES 205-07 (2018) (describing when suffering does not count as punishment).
251
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D. Overriding Cases: Pure Prevention Dangerousness Detention,
Unavoidable Errors, and Gaps
As noted above, sometimes the justification for detaining someone is
that her rights are overridden for the greater good. Most notably is the case
of pure prevention dangerousness detention. This is likely what courts and
legislators believe they are doing. Judges detain based on statistical evidence
of likelihood of offending or gestalt determinations. They are not inquiring
into an actual intention to commit another offense. They are just predicting.
Indeed, today our goal is to find better predictive instruments. As mentioned
above, this sort of prediction does not require the defendant to do anything
that forfeits her rights. So, her rights remain in full force. Accordingly, the
only thing that justifies detaining an innocent person (as we should treat her)
based on prediction of harm is that we are entitled to override her rights if the
stakes are high enough. Above, I suggested that we should be deeply
skeptical of this sort of detention, but even viewed in its most favorable light,
it is about overriding the defendant’s rights.
There are two other cases that can fall in this category. When we
make unavoidable errors, there is a question of how to understand these acts.
Mitchell Berman argues that our accidental punishment of the innocent can
only be justified through overriding the innocents’ rights, as they certainly do
have rights against the suffering that is imposed upon them.252 So, too,
unavoidable errors in pretrial detention are justified in this way.
Then, there are “gaps.” Assume that we are justified in asking for bail
but the defendant cannot pay it. Even if the detention is not wholly unjust, as
there is (let us assume) a rationale for requiring bail, we are still imposing
greater harm on the defendant than we would prefer to do. It is simply that
we do not have a mechanism that will achieve our goals short of detention.
If the defendant’s rights are being overridden, then we need to cause
him minimal harm and compensate him after the fact. This is not akin to the
person who will not do his duty or who has forfeited rights by aiming to
obstruct or flee. This is akin to what we owe an innocent person whom we
harm because their interest is overridden by the greater good.
For the reasons suggested above dealing with unjust detentions, time
served is appropriate. It is a way of giving the defendant back what we took
from her. It is arguably the same as compensating the dock owner for the
extent of damage caused by the yacht that slammed against it in the storm.
Once again, however, it leaves the innocent completely uncompensated.
252

Mitchell N. Berman, Punishment and Justification, 118 ETHICS 258, 289 (2008)
(noting “the peripheral cases of “misfiring” are pretty obviously not justified in the normal
situation . . . except as unavoidable consequences of a practice that is justifiable even
accounting for these costs”).

Electronic copy available at: https://ssrn.com/abstract=4041973

52

The Trouble with Time Served

****
The practice of giving credit for time served may be justified in some
cases as either compensation or punishment. When detention is unjust, time
served can count as time spent being punished or compensation for the harm
of detention. When detention is only justified as a taking, time served can
play the role of serving as just compensation. In contrast, when detention is
justified because the defendant has forfeited her right against the liberty
restriction, credit for time served is unwarranted as deserved compensation
or punishment.
IV.

BEYOND TIME SERVED

Time served is a one-size-fits-all response to our detention practices.
To be sure, sometimes, legal rules will need less nuance. Indeed, I will
propose an alternative one-size-fits-all solution in what follows. The problem
is that this singular cure is ill suited to the disease, and in fact, may exacerbate
it. After discussing the trouble with time served, this Part closes with a sketch
of an alternative compensatory framework that is not only more responsive
to our detention rationales and equality concerns but also aims to drive further
criminal justice reform.
A. Why Time Served Is Objectionable
We have adopted a “one size fits all” solution to a complex set of
rationales. But credit for time served is ill suited to be fully responsive to
detention rationales. It is under inclusive if there are reasons to treat it as
punishment. It is under inclusive if aims to compensate, as it ignores an entire
class of detainees. It is over inclusive in giving credit to those who forfeit. It
is morally objectionable if it countenances the prepunishment of those
presumed innocent.
Notably, as set out in Part I.B., jurisdictions adopted time served for
reasons other than an attempt to provide a nuanced response to nuanced
detention rationales. The legislative history is not replete with accounts of
forfeiture and overriding. Rather, some code drafters, like the American Law
Institute, thought “well, pretrial detention is punishment.”253 Others, like
Wisconsin, cared that it was a cost-cutting measure.254 For still others, like
California, it aimed to equalize treatment of rich and poor defendants.255
253

See supra text accompanying note 141.
See supra text accompanying note 146.
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However laudable these goals may be, time served operates in ways
that exacerbate criminal justice problems. This Part details why egalitarians,
expressivists, deontologists, and legal economists should all seek to reform
our practices.
1. The Egalitarian or Rule-of-Law Objection
There has been one familiar refrain throughout our analysis and that
is that defendants whose cases are dismissed and defendants who are
acquitted do not reap the benefits of our current practices. This is striking.
Consider the case of a poor person unable to make bail. A rich person—
guilty or innocent—who is able to make bail is not detained. A guilty, poor
person who is detained receives credit against his sentence. But the poor,
innocent person is left completely uncompensated. A compensatory scheme
that selects out poor, innocent people as the group to receive nothing is
incoherent and unfair.
Moreover, while poverty is a driver for many detainees,256 the same
objection remains for any defendant whose case is dismissed or who has been
found not guilty, and is thereby treated differently than a guilty person. If a
rights-overriding justification is at work, then the detainee is entitled to
compensation. That we would choose to compensate only those found guilty
is wildly counterintuitive.
Rule-of-law values that require us to treat citizens as equals cannot
countenance giving a benefit only to the guilty. Although compensating
some individuals may be better than compensating no individuals, this sort
of concession to our nonideal realities is simply insufficient if we can do
better. The sheer irrationality of the law’s unequal treatment cries out for a
better approach to compensating our detainees.

Penal Code Section 2900.5, 3 PEPP. L. REV. 157 (1975) (suggesting multiple rationales for
adoption including developments in federal law, equity between wealthy and poor
defendants, and civil rights law).
256

The Prison Policy Initiative studied the demographics of people unable to meet bail:
We find that most people who are unable to meet bail fall within the poorest third
of society. Using Bureau of Justice Statistics data, we find that, in 2015 dollars,
people in jail had a median annual income of $15,109 prior to their incarceration,
which is less than half (48%) of the median for non-incarcerated people of similar
ages. People in jail are even poorer than people in prison and are drastically poorer
than their non-incarcerated counterparts.
BERNADETTE RABUY & DANIEL KOPF, PRISON POL’Y INITIATIVE, DETAINING THE POOR:
HOW MONEY BAIL PERPETUATES AN ENDLESS CYCLE OF POVERTY AND JAIL TIME 6 (2016),
https://www.prisonpolicy.org/reports/DetainingThePoor.pdf (footnotes omitted).
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2. The Prevention-Is-Not-Punishment Objection
Different aspects of our criminal justice system are thought to serve
different functions. The Supreme Court has repeatedly noted that our
detention practices, which have preventive goals, are not punishment.257 In
contrast, our punishment practices are intended to convey stigma and inflict
suffering.258 Indeed, the import and solemnity of punishment is supported by
our commitments to proof beyond a reasonable, requirements of
confrontation, and a host of protections that must exist before we do
something as serious as punishing another person.259
Time served threatens this division of labor. During the time in
detention, the defendant has not been convicted. He may feel that he is being
“punished,” but the state has not pronounced his guilt and he does not
understand his detention as warranted punishment. So, too, victims and
victims’ families cannot understand pretrial detention as part of what the
defendant deserves. If punishment is thought to serve communicative goals,
our current practice sends decidedly mixed messages.
Conversely, to the extent that defendants and victims do perceive
detention as punishment, this, too, is problematic because punishment is not
authorized. The defendant has not been afforded the kind of procedure, with
the correct evidentiary standard, that warrants this treatment. We are
unjustified in sending this message.
We should not be retroactively taking a practice that is thought to be
non-punitive, and treating it as punishment after the fact. There are no “time
transformations,” just legal sleights of hand.
Moreover, by allowing the ultimate conflation of prevention with
punishment through the grant of credit for time served, we hamper jail
reform. If pretrial detention were seen as a taking, similar to what we owe
the sequestered juror, we would not allow the conditions of our state “hotels”
to be punitive. And, once they were not punitive, we would be hard pressed
257

See supra Section I.A.1.
See Bell v. Wolfish, 441 U.S. 520 (1979) (pretrial detention); Kansas v. Hendricks,
521 U.S. 346 (1997) (involuntary commitment of sex offenders); Addington v. Texas, 441
U.S. 418, 427-28 (1979) (stating that the criminal burden of proof is inapplicable to review
a civil commitment because civil commitment is not punishment).
259
In re Winship, 397 U.S. 358, 364 (1970) (“[T]he Due Process Clause protects the
accused against conviction except upon proof beyond a reasonable doubt of every fact
necessary to constitute the crime with which he is charged.”); Crawford v. Washington,
541 U.S. 36, 68 (2004) (defining confrontation right); Ramos v. Louisiana, 140 S. Ct. 1390,
1397 (2020) (“There can be no question either that the Sixth Amendment's unanimity
requirement applies to state and federal criminal trials equally.”).
258
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to see why they should count as punishment. Our practice deprives detainees
of the procedural rights of punishment while allowing our treatment of
detainees to be punitive because we count it as punishment on the back end.

3. The Deontological Objection
Rights theorist should also be troubled by our current practices. We
detain people unjustly. We turn the innocent into the guilty. And we under
punish some defendants. Although one can be a deontologist (who thereby
cares about rights) without being a retributivist, I combine these views here
as nothing turns on it.
Under punishing the guilty is the least worrisome in this context.
Over punishing is more troubling than under punishing. Nevertheless, the
defendant who truly deserves to be punished is receiving credit even though
she is locked up because she plans to kills a witness.260 If we think that
someone’s getting what she deserves is intrinsically good, we are failing to
achieve that good.
However, given that retributivists generally agree that the current
practice of criminal law is over inclusive and punishes too much and not too
little,261 the real worry here is rights violations. There are people we
shouldn’t be detaining. It is better not to wrong them in the first place than
to seek to compensate them after the fact. Crediting for time served seeks to
hide the wrong we do when we unjustly detain.
A final concern for the retributivist is the practical reality of what
credit for time served does. It induces the innocent to plead guilty. A
defendant charged with a misdemeanor has significant incentives to simply
plead guilty if that means she gets out now as opposed to fighting the case at
trial.262 As Josh Bowers poignantly argues:

260

See supra Part III.C (rejecting credit for time served when the defendant is detained
on forfeiture grounds).
261
Retributivists of late have been getting a bad rap, but they are just as worried about
current criminal justice pathologies as others. See Douglas Husak, Retributivism and OverPunishment, LAW & PHIL. 22 (Sept. 4, 2021), https://doi.org/10.1007/s10982-021-09422-w
(“[R]etributivists should be encouraged to promote themselves as part of the solution rather
than as a cause of the problem of mass incarceration and over-punishment.”).
262
As Samuel Wiseman notes:
[M]any defendants detained pretrial are charged with relatively low-level crimes
with short sentences, and when pretrial detention counts toward their sentence, these
defendants serve only a few days post-conviction. Thus, a plea often results in a
quicker release than contesting the case, whatever the ultimate outcome.
Samuel R. Wiseman, Bail and Mass Incarceration, 52 GA. L. REV. 235, 241 (2018).

Electronic copy available at: https://ssrn.com/abstract=4041973

56

The Trouble with Time Served

If the defendant can get a plea to a misdemeanor and time served, then
the process constitutes the whole punishment. Any plea that frees this
defendant may be more than advisable—it may be salvation. No matter
how certain of acquittal, she is better off pleading guilty. She is the
defendant who benefits most from plea bargaining, and she is the very
defendant who most frequently is innocent in fact.263
Even if our practices are not so coercive as to undermine consent, we should
still worry that our practices serve as a compelling reason for a person to
accept punishment she does not deserve.264
4. The Law and Economics Objection
The economist should be troubled by the incentive effects created by
our current practices. The state fails to internalize the costs of its detention
practices in two ways. First, the innocent defendants who are inappropriately
detained are uncompensated. Though the state pays to detain the defendant,
it does not pay for its mistake. Second, the state does not have to fully
internalize the cost of its overzealous pretrial detention practices, practices
that disproportionately externalize the costs onto people of color. If the state
gets to credit the detentions against future punishment, then the state pays for
less total incarceration. This means that detention is not nearly as expensive
for the state as it should be. The state should have to justify the cost of
detention—the cost of taking the person—as well as justify the cost of
punishment.
B. The Path Forward
It is apparent that time served is problematic. But we have to question
whether to rip off the Band Aid. The idea that criminal defendants suffer in
punitive conditions and then receive no credit hardly seems like the better
solution.
263

Josh Bowers, Punishing the Innocent, 156 U. PA. L. REV. 1117, 1136-37 (2008);
accord Stephanos Bibas, Plea Bargaining Outside the Shadow of Trial, 117 HARV. L. REV.
2463, 2492-93 (2004) (“The pretrial detention can approach or even exceed the punishment
that a court would impose after trial. . . . The defendant’s best-case scenario becomes not
zero days in jail, but the length of time already served.”); Gerard E. Lynch, Our
Administrative System of Criminal Justice, 66 FORDHAM L. REV. 2117, 2146 (1998)
(“Pleading guilty at the first opportunity in exchange for a sentence of "time [already] served"
is often an offer that cannot be refused.”) (alteration in original).
264
Accord Heaton, Mayson, and Stevenson, supra note 17, at 716 (“Misdemeanor
pretrial detention therefore seems especially likely to induce guilty pleas, including wrongful
ones.”).
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From my ivory tower, it is easy to see what should be done. Stop
detaining so many people. Then, most defendants who are legitimately
detained will require nothing, and we can simply compensate when rights are
being overridden. Add to that my sympathies for whole-life desert views,265
and I could present a nuanced and detailed account of who gets what and
when.
But I can scarcely see the abyss of the real-world practice of criminal
law from high in my ivory tower. Our practices are so defective and so far
from just that what might be the ideal solution in a far more ideal world could
leave us decidedly worse off in this one. After all, the abolition of credit for
time served with nothing to replace it would result in more injustice than
simply leaving this ad hoc and unprincipled practice in place.
What the actual criminal law needs is a replacement that 1) places
pressure on our pretrial detention practices so as to minimize unjust
detentions, 2) treats innocent people (at least) equivalently to the guilty, 3) is
responsive to the real world fact that most detentions are either unjust or in
need of compensation, and 4) makes room for jails to be nothing like prisons.
Accordingly, I propose we compensate all pretrial detainees, while
simultaneously recognizing that the conditions of confinement ought to be
improved substantially. Let me sketch out such a compensation model and
defend against potential objections.
1. Compensating Detention
We pay material witnesses.266 We pay jurors.267 We should pay
pretrial detainees. Specifically, jurisdictions, in addition to providing the
kind of room and board that we give to jurors, should compensate detainees
at least at the juror’s daily rate. If we detain them for us, we should pay them
for serving us.268
Kimberly Kessler Ferzan, Defense and Desert: When Reasons Don’t Share, 55 SAN
DIEGO L. REV. 265, 287 (2018) (confessing to being “slightly more than tempted” by the
view).
266
28 U.S.C. § 1821(b), (d) (government pays $40/day plus food and shelter).
267
Juror Pay, U.S. CTS., https://www.uscourts.gov/services-forms/jury-service/jurorpay (last visited Jan. 20, 2022)(jurors receive $50/day).
268
This is not to endorse the use of fines. First, I take it fines are objectionable because
they are imposed on people who cannot afford them, furthering a cycle of poverty and
inhibiting reentry. MATTHEW MENENDEZ, MICHAEL F. CROWLEY, LAUREN-BROOKE EISEN
& NOAH ATCHISON, BRENNAN CTR. FOR JUST., THE STEEP COSTS OF CRIMINAL JUSTICE FEES
AND FINES: A FISCAL ANALYSIS OF THREE STATES AND TEN COUNTIES 6-7 (2019),
https://www.brennancenter.org/our-work/research-reports/steep-costs-criminal-justice-feesand-fines. In contrast, this compensatory scheme is decidedly not about punishment.
Second, though one might worry that I am making detention and compensation
265
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This is a one-size-fits-all rule. We should be clear why this rule is
superior to making distinctions along three lines: 1) the rationale for
detention, 2) the guilt or innocence of the defendant, and 3) the defendant’s
preference for credit versus compensation.
First, as we have seen, detentions are sometimes justified because the
detainee is liable, sometimes justified as overriding the right (provided
compensation is granted), and sometimes simply wrong the detainee. We
might start by trying to come up with a nuanced statutory scheme that is
responsive to these disparate rationales. It would release those whom we
would otherwise be wrong, and it would provide for compensation only for
those whose rights are overridden (as opposed to those who have forfeited
rights). However, this would require considerable precision in distinguishing
forfeiture and overriding cases, something that would itself be quite
expensive in increasing adjudication time, and moreover, would be prone to
placing pressure on judges to find that defendants have forfeited rights, as
that would substantially decrease the cost for the state. Given how few
defendants actually fall in this category, the cost of identifying them, and the
likelihood we would ensnare actors who are not liable in the net, caution
dictates that we opt for a rule that is overinclusive in its compensation.
Second, this compensation should likewise make no distinction
between the guilty and the not guilty. Of course, at the moment only the
guilty are compensated (with credit for time served), but we should not do a
full about face and only compensate the innocent. Whether the defendant is
guilty of the offense is a wholly different question from whether we can
justify detaining the defendant. It is appropriate to punish the defendant for
her crime. It is not appropriate to leave her uncompensated when we only
detain her because we apply a predictive dangerousness test. Even if there
are some incentive effects that may result from compensating only the
innocent, by, for example, causing prosecutors to only pursue stronger
cases,269 this would ignore the simple fact that the forward-looking detention
commensurable (the mirror image of Kolber’s objection supra Part III.A.1), the simple fact
is that we accept this in law. Takings are paid with money, as are damages in a range of tort
actions from wrongful death to loss of consortium.
269
Jeffrey Manns, Liberty Takings: A Framework for Compensating Pretrial Detainees,
26 CARDOZO L. REV. 1947, 2011 (2005):
The impact of liberty takings would be seen in cases in which the government has
enough evidence to satisfy probable cause, yet faces uncertainty as to whether it can
satisfy the beyond a reasonable doubt standard at trial. The more dubious the
government's ability to prevail at trial, the more the possibility of a liberty takings claim
may factor into decisions of both prosecutors and defendants.
See also Murat C. Mungan & Jonathan Klick, Reducing False Guilty Pleas and Wrongful
Convictions Through Exoneree Compensation, 59 J. L. & ECON. 173 (2016) (demonstrating
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rationale and the backward-looking punishment question are fully distinct. If
we detain someone for what she may do in the future, and for that we owe
her compensation, then what she has done in the past is simply irrelevant.
Third, this scheme should not allow detainees to opt for credit for time
served as opposed to compensation. Admittedly, there are reasons for such a
system. It would allow the guilty who are later convicted to cash out their
detention against their sentence while compensating the innocent. Given the
horrendous detention conditions, it seems, well, unfair, not to allow this hard
treatment to count as punishment.
Here are two reasons not to opt for such a system. A minor reason is
that this could be hard to administer. Detainees should be compensated
weekly so that they can provide for their families, and otherwise use the
funds. This would make it difficult for defendants to predict future
consequences or to change their minds.
The more substantial reason, however, is that one goal is jail reform.
And jail reform is not possible so long as jail is commensurable with prison.
We want to improve jail conditions and free them from anything punitive,
placing the least restrictive conditions necessary in them. To do that, we have
to break the link.
Admittedly, this could make some inmates worse off in the short term,
and reformers should make changes with their eyes wide open. It may be that
compensation for substandard conditions should be an additional charge
against the state until it meets the juror’s Holiday Inn standard of detention.
2. Justifying Compensation
This scheme depends upon a right to compensation, so let me spend
a moment further defending that claim. At the moral level, compensation is
due to those whose rights are violated or infringed.270 Violations are the easy
case. We clearly understand why if I punch you for no reason, defame you,
trample your roses, and so forth, I am required to pay you for harms that I do
to you intentionally. If our rules are unjustifiably overinclusive (or if you
join me in being highly suspicious that pure prevention dangerous detention
is justified), then compensation is due for our intentionally putting people in
cages without a good reason to do so.
that exoneree compensation decreases wrongful convictions); Richard Hynes, The Optimal
Evidence Threshold: Balancing the Frequency and Severity of Wrongful Punishment, 26 S.
CT. ECON. REV. 113, 131 (2019) (arguing that rewarding the innocent will prevent chilling
benign behavior).
270
Notably, not all government actions require compensation. Specifically, when
everyone reciprocally benefits from a government practice that is distributively just, there is
no need to compensate. Thus, you are not compensated for going through airport security
because you are also a beneficiary of the practice.
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Additionally, philosophers have long maintained that when a right,
such as the right to liberty, is outweighed by more significant reasons, it is
permissible to infringe the right but the right-holder must be compensated. If
I must trample on your roses to get my sick child to the hospital, I may so
trample, but I owe you compensation for the harm I cause.271
My claim is not that the current law clearly and consistently requires
this compensation, nor that it is demanded by an interpretation of the Fifth
Amendment itself.272 Instead, the argument is that the theoretical
underpinnings we see in Vincent v. Lake Erie and the Fifth Amendment’s
taking clause, have equal if not more applicability when we physically take
someone and put them in jail for our benefit.
I am not the first to recognize that these sorts of rights infringements
call out for compensation. Bruce Ackerman notes the absurdity that we
compensate “[w]hen a small piece of property is taken to build a new
highway,”273 yet deny compensation for those wrongfully convicted or
preventively detained.274 He argues, “Not only is this callous treatment
scandalously unjust, but it cannot be justified by any of the theories of just
compensation law that are taken seriously by the courts or commentators.”275
Other scholars have echoed these calls for compensation for wrongful
convictions,276 for preventive detention,277 and for pretrial detainees.278
One objection to this line of argument is that although private
necessity is not a defense to trespass, public necessity is. Isn’t this a public
necessity case?
Two points here. First, doctrinally, public necessity only applies to
property damage.279 Kenneth Simons, the Reporter for the Restatement
271

Joel Feinberg, Voluntary Euthanasia and the Inalienable Right to Life, 7 PHIL. &
PUBLIC AFFAIRS 93, 102 (1978) (arguing one owes compensation when one infringes a right).
272
Cf. Manns, supra note 269.
273
Ackerman, supra note 188, at 1063.
274
Id. at 1063-64.
275
Id. at 1064-65.
276
John Martinez, Wrongful Convictions as Rightful Takings: Protecting LibertyProperty, 59 HASTINGS L.J. 515 (2007).
277
Corrado, supra note 188; Robinson, supra note 188.
278
Although Manns and I both offer compensation schemes for pretrial detainees, our
arguments and rationales are quite distinct. Manns does not unpack the underlying rights
relationships; he leaves time served in place for the guilty; and he justifies the
pretrial/postconviction detention linkage on a problematic forfeiture theory. See, e.g.,
Manns, supra note 269, at 1981 (continuing time served), and 1990 (relying on guilt as
forfeiture). In terms of implementation, his article presents a more legalistic argument for
linking his “liberty takings” to the actual law of takings. See id. at 1985-89, 1992 (arguing
pretrial detention is akin to a regulatory taking).
279
Kenneth W. Simons, Self-Defense, Necessity, and the Duty to Compensate, in Law
and Morality, 55 SAN DIEGO L. REV. 357, 372 (2018).
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(Third) of Torts, found no cases in which public necessity was a defense to
overriding other’s bodily rights to avoid the greater evil.280
Second, as Simons rightly points out, the fact that the do-gooder who
intervenes for the public does not owe the victim any compensation does not
resolve the question of whether there ought to be mechanisms for the state to
compensate.281 In asking that question, Simons answers in accord with the
view expressed here:
[T]he community ought to take steps to provide some form of
compensation to the innocent victim. For example, compensation could
be funded out of general taxes. When a person is deliberately harmed for
the public good or to avoid a greater evil, she has an especially powerful
claim to be made whole or at least to have her burden alleviated.
Similarly, when government officials deliberately infringe the property
and personal rights of citizens in order to avoid a greater evil, the
government should pay compensation.282
That we do not have such a compensatory scheme is a failure of
justice. And the fact that individual plaintiffs cannot recover from the dogooder defendant in tort goes not distance in showing that individual
plaintiffs have not been wronged when their rights are overridden for the sake
of the public
3. Impacts
There are several goals for this compensatory approach. First, for
defendants whom the state wrongs by detaining them when it should not, and
for the defendants who are being “taken” for the greater good, the defendant
is receiving compensation she is due. This compensation is available to
defendants whether they are guilty or innocent. After all, both the guilty and
the innocent are having their rights overridden.
Second, this compensatory scheme makes pretrial detention more
expensive.283 This scheme forces the state to pay 1) for housing the detainee,
2) for “taking” the detainee, and 3) for (when convicted) punishing the
detainee. This increases costs substantially. Although we may aim to cut
280

Id. at 372.
Id. at 373.
282
Id.; see also Zachery Hunter, Note, You Break It, You Buy It—Unless You Have a
Badge? An Argument Against a Categorical Police Powers Exception to Just Compensation,
82 OHIO ST. L.J. 695, 701 (arguing for compensation for property damage caused by police).
283
Accord Manns, supra note 269, at 1979 (noting that raising costs of pretrial detention
may curb over reliance).
281
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costs and to minimize the carceral state, sometimes cost cutting is not a good
thing. Maybe detention ought to be expensive enough that when we cannot
do it right, we should just do without. If the state must pay for its
overinclusive practices, it will have to think twice about whether to be
overinclusive.284
Third, this reform empowers defendants. Imagine that detainees were
to receive what a federal juror receives—$50 a day.285 Detainees spend an
average of twenty-six days in jail.286 This would result in $1300 for that
detention.
Consider how this compares to the average detainee’s monthly
income. In 2002 dollars, Rabuy and Kopf’s 2016 study found that the average
monthly income for someone held in jail was $1,061 for men and $671 for
women.287 Black men had an average income of $900 a month, and Black
women $568.288 Adjusted for inflation to 2022 but without any other altered
assumptions, those figures are $1644.30 (average male income), $1039.89
(average female income), $1394.78 (average Black male income), and
$880.26 (average Black female income).289 These amounts are more than the
amounts preventing many defendants from making bail at all.290 This would
mean that defendants will be less likely to plead to crimes they did not
commit simply to secure their release. It would mean that they would be less
284

Economists frequently advance this sort of argument with respect to deterring
government overreach by making it pay for regulatory takings. See RICHARD A. POSNER,
ECONOMIC ANALYSIS OF Law 58 (4th ed. 1992) ("The simplest economic explanation for the
requirement of just compensation is that it prevents the government from overusing the
taking power.”); Richard A. Epstein, From Penn Central to Lingle: The Long Backwards
Road, 40 J. MARSHALL L. REV. 593, 595 (2007) (arguing that Supreme Court decisions
narrowing the scope of compensable takings had the effect of “enlarging state power”);
Michael A. Heller & James E. Krier, Deterrence and Distribution in the Law of Takings, 112
HARV. L. REV. 997, 999 (1999) (suggesting that one of the primary purposes of the Takings
Clause is to deter overuse of government takings); John D. Echeverria, The Costs of Koontz,
39 VT. L. REV. 573, 573 (2015) (explaining how, in the context of environmental
conservation, stricter judicial review under the Takings and Due Process Clauses leads to
“greater . . . constraints on government action”).
285
Juror Pay, U.S. CTS., https://www.uscourts.gov/services-forms/jury-service/jurorpay (last visited Jan. 20, 2022).
286
See supra note 80.
287
BERNADETTE RABUY & DANIEL KOPF, supra note 256.
288
Id.
289
US INFLATION CALCULATOR (last visited Jan. 11, 2022).
290
MARIE VANNOSTRAND, NEW JERSEY JAIL POPULATION ANALYSIS: IDENTIFYING
OPPORTUNITIES TO SAFELY AND RESPONSIBLY REDUCE THE JAIL POPULATION 13 & tbl.11
(2013),
https://drugpolicy.org/sites/default/files/New_Jersey_Jail_Population_Analysis_March_20
13.pdf (“[T]here were approximately 800 inmates held in custody who could have secured
their release for $500 or less.”).
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likely to plead to crimes when the state cannot meet its constitutional burden
of proof beyond a reasonable doubt. It would mean that after a few days,
some defendants would have the money in hand to pay their bail. And it also
means that at least some of the costs of their incapacitation (on income, child
care, and the like) may be offset by the fact that they are being compensated
for their detention.
Fourth, a recognition that this is a taking fundamentally alters our
perception of detainees themselves. When we think about detainees as
“germ[s]” who cannot be “turn[ed] loose . . . in th[e] community,” we treat
people as fundamentally lesser.291 When we recognize that we are harming
them for us, and they are entitled to compensation because of our harm to
them, we shift the perspective. We incarcerate too many people because we
undermine their moral worth.292
Fifth, from a racial justice standpoint, it is imperative to reduce the
number of people of color who are currently detained. Because our system,
either through requirements of unmeetable bail or through racially-biased
dangerousness assessments, contributes to and exacerbates inequalities, the
more we limit who is detained, the better.293 The more we put money in
people’s pockets to make bail, the better. And, the more that we require our
system to recognize equality before the law by paying the people we detain
for the harm we do them, the better.
Finally, this scheme fundamentally severs the linkage to punishment.
Imagine that you, our juror, are convicted of a crime three years from now.
You then ask the court to take into account the time you spent as a juror
sleeping at a Holiday Inn. Absurd! That’s the point. Jail should never be
commensurate with punishment.
4. Objections
I have gestured at compensation as a replacement for time served. It
is my aim to start a dialogue about an underappreciated pathology, not to
offer the final word. And, admittedly, my solution is open to potential
objections and counter arguments. Let me offer five.

291
Carlson v. Landon, 342 U.S. 524, 550 (1952) (Black, J. dissenting) (quoting the trial
court’s reference to detainees).
292
Joseph E. Kennedy, Monstrous Offenders and the Search for Solidarity through
Modern Punishment, 51 HASTINGS L.J. 829, 897 (2000) (contending that our discourse
“portrays the offender only in the monodimensional light of his potential dangerousness to
society and, in so doing, makes him society's ultimate scapegoat”).
293
See supra note 3.
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a. Constitutional requirements
Recall that one motivation for credit for time served was that courts
thought that there were constitutional infirmities with detaining the poor but
not the rich. Will this compensatory provision be constitutional?
In a word: Yes. First, Supreme Court jurisprudence has evolved in ways
that firmly deny that defendants are punished for their pretrial detentions.
Accordingly, decisions relying on equating detention and punishment would
not withstand current doctrine.294
More importantly, the animating concern is a failure to treat people
equally. This proposal does eliminate inequality. It not only eliminates
inequality between the guilty rich and the guilty poor, but it eliminates
inequality between the innocent poor and the guilty poor. A scheme aimed
at making defendants whole will not present constitutional problems.
b. It’s not enough
Another worry is that the amounts that I propose are not enough. I
won’t even begin to deny that. It is undoubtedly true that detaining people
raises myriad secondary harms for which the juror rate may be insufficient.
Ultimately, I worry that offering too much money simply isn’t politically
feasible. I also believe that we should not underestimate the good that would
come from compensating the myriad individuals who are currently left with
nothing.

c. Why not eliminate cash bail?
We might think that the first step is to eliminate cash bail.
Undoubtedly, eliminating cash bail is important for eliminating inequities.
And, my proposal is not offered in lieu of bail reform.
Problems remain, however. First, early research about New Jersey’s
experience with bail reform indicates that racial inequities persist.295 Second,
we should not lose sight of those whom we still choose to detain. We detain
individuals simply because we think they are dangerous, and when we do
this, we detain them for us. Eliminating cash bail, subsidizing home
294

E.g., United States v. Salerno, 481 U.S. 739 (1987).
GLENN A. GRANT, N.J. CTS., 2018 CRIMINAL JUSTICE REFORM REPORT TO THE
GOVERNOR
AND
THE
LEGISLATURE
7
(2018),
https://www.njcourts.gov/courts/assets/criminal/2018cjrannual.pdf (noting that, despite
some improvements in the overall demographics of those detained pretrial, black males
continued to be overrepresented in the pretrial jail population).
295
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monitoring,296 and other reforms may decrease the number of people who are
in pretrial detention, and that is a significant step forward. But these reforms
do nothing for how we think of those we choose to detain. And some states,
in the wake of changes in cash bail, contemplate detaining more people as
dangerous, not fewer.297
Reimagining pretrial detention requires a comprehensive rethinking.
We need jail reform as much as we need bail reform. And we cannot lose
sight of the myriad defendants who will be detained under any system we
adopt.
d. Will judges detain more frequently?
We might worry that these reforms will increase the likelihood that
judges detain people pretrial. Imagine jails are nicer. Imagine detainees get
paid. Doesn’t that lower the bar for a judge to feel comfortable locking
someone up?298
Three thoughts. First, if the worst case scenario of my proposal is that
we put more people up at Holiday Inn-like accommodations and pay them, it
still seems better than where we are. Second, it seems just as likely that
judges are influenced in the reverse. Perhaps they think that they don’t want
the state to pay for a misdemeanant to be compensated and given
accommodations by the state. It may be that paying detainees, and being less
296

Duffy and Hynes, supra note 20 (arguing that monitoring should be subsidized);
Samuel R. Wiseman, Pretrial Detention and the Right to Be Monitored, 123 YALE L.J. 1344,
1364-80 (2014) (advocating for electronic monitoring in lieu of money bail to address flight
risk).
297
Emily Hamer & Sheila Cohen, Poor Stay in Jail While Rich Go Free: Rethinking
Cash Bail in Wisconsin, WIS. PUB. RADIO (Jan. 21, 2019, 6:00 AM),
https://www.wpr.org/poor-stay-jail-while-rich-go-free-rethinking-cash-bail-wisconsin
(“Kremers said what Wisconsin needs is a law that would allow judges to hold defendants
who pose significant public safety risks with no option to bail out. Those not considered
dangerous could be released without bail—taking a defendant’s ability to pay out of the
equation.”); Jamiles Lartey, New York Rolled Back Bail Reform. What Will the Rest of the
Country
Do?,
MARSHALL
PROJECT
(Apr.
23,
2020,
6:00
AM),
https://www.themarshallproject.org/2020/04/23/in-new-york-s-bail-reform-backlash-acautionary-tale-for-other-states (noting availability of dangerousness detention in Colorado
and Illinois and pushback that has resulted from New York’s bail reform because it does not
allow for judicial discretion to assess dangerousness).
298
This is akin to the argument that fines become prices. See Uri Gneezy & Aldo
Rustichini, A Fine Is a Price, 29 J. LEGAL STUD. 1, 15-16 (2000) (finding that day care fines
for late arrivals increased the number of parents who arrived late because they treated it as a
price). But see Cherie Metcalf, Emily A. Satterthwaite, J. Shahar Dillbary & Brock Stoddard,
Is a Fine Still a Price? Replication as Robustness in Empirical Legal Studies, INT’L REV. L.
& ECON., Sept. 2020, at 1, 24 (article no. 105906) (failing to replicate Gneezy and Aldo’s
study and finding the fines did decrease the behavior).
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punitive, is simply less appealing (particularly to those judges and
prosecutors who would never admit it, but are actually relying on a desertbased dangerousness justification of detention).
Finally and most
importantly, this compensation scheme is not a strategy that aims to change
the incentives for prosecutors or judges. Rather, the targets are the legislative
and executive branches, which will find pretrial detention too expensive. If
judges start to increase this cost, then we should expect their discretion to be
statutorily limited by the other branches.
e. Exacerbating injustice
We all know the saying that “you cannot get blood from a stone.” If
the criminal justice system is woefully underfunded, it seems unlikely that
putting financial pressure on states will improve conditions. The system I
imagine is expensive, and states aim to reduce costs.
This is a real worry. And the case against putting financial pressure
on states is not simply that we don’t have funding. It is how we wind up
making up the difference. To save money on its prisons, Arizona reduced
heat and air conditioning, added fees, bought damaged food, and created
female chain gangs who worked for fifty cents an hour in the blistering
heat.299 Alternatively, states could turn to more arduous fines to make up the
difference.300 When our criminal justice system needs to cut costs, the
measures it uses rarely inure to the benefit of prisoners.
It is simply true that this policy proposal requires a commitment to
how much should be spent by the state per detainee. If we are unwilling to
pay this amount, we should be unwilling to detain. If we pay for the property
we intend to take for the greater good, we must be willing to do the same for
people. And reformers will need to remain vigilant in ensuring that these
reform measures are not counterproductive.
CONCLUSION
Here is where we are. If we took seriously our obligations to only
detain those whom we are fully justified in detaining, then we should detain
those who harbor the intention to flee, obstruct, or harm others. And, if we
limited our pretrial detention practices to those individuals, we should
eliminate credit for time served.
In contrast, our current practices are wildly over inclusive. We
essentially detain people because they are poor. We confuse excusable
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failures to appear with true flight. We decide people are “dangerous” and
cannot walk among us. We reduce people to “germs” we cannot “let loose”
on society.
Time served has allowed for creative accounting and a lack of full
recognition of what we are doing and to whom. Our practices are concerning
in a number of ways. First, the state has not had to internalize the cost of its
wrongdoing. Instead of facing the overwhelming number of detentions and
our addiction to incarceration, the state has been able to credit the former
against the latter. That means that many of the state’s errors cost far less than
they otherwise would.
Second, our practices, even with time served, mistreat the legally
innocent. Defendants who are detained but have charges dismissed or who
are found not guilty are not entitled to such credit. The wrong we do to them
remains unremedied.
Third, our practices turn the innocent into the guilty. As has been
established, defendants who are held pretrial are more likely to be found
guilty. Indeed, our ability to detain someone and then offer them the prospect
of release with no more than time served can be said to induce pleas.
In other words, we write off our overzealous detention policies by
setting off the time. We ignore the tremendous debt that we owe the innocent.
And, we shift our debts from the red to the black by influencing who is
convicted and who is not.
It is time to recognize the tragic human debt that we are creating. It
is time to stop treating jail as punishment. This Article aims to begin the
dialogue of what should replace time served. It has gestured at a fairer
compensatory scheme. But whether we adopt compensation, or some other
reform, we cannot move forward until we sever detention and punishment.
Time served must go.
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